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PREFACE 
                                                     
 
“The longing for a better world will need to arise at the imagined meeting place of many 
movements of resistance, as many as there are sites of enclosure and exclusion. The resistance 
will be as transnational as capital. Because enclosure takes myriad forms, so shall resistance to 
it.” 
- Iain A Boal, First World, Ha Ha Ha!, City Lights, 1995 
 
Boal’s description captures the exuberance, hope and confidence of today’s social movements. 
That there is something irresistible about autonomous, grassroots and subaltern movements in 
their anti-systemic alternatives to capitalism has become a notion which has gained considerable 
currency in recent years.1 Formations of these groups (the Zapatistas being the oft cited example) 
are seen to mirror theories of the most utopian and radical forms of democracy. In Part 1 we seek 
to examine a range of critical historiography in exploring the features of what is ‘new’ in today’s 
social movements, using Zapatista style organization and discourse as the prototype. This 
definition will be moulded with the elements of critical theory which have at their core a radical 
transformative function of social movements. For example Castells’ work on urban movements 
pictures: “collective conscious action aimed at the transformation of the institutionalized urban 
meaning against the logic, interest and values of the dominant class.”2 We will draw from 
Murray’s assumption that such movements “actively contest the prevailing forms of political 
representation and the legitimacy of political rule.”3
 
New social movements (NSM) will be seen within the context of anti-normative approaches to 
democracy. An alternative pole of reference will emerge in contrast to what we will term low 
intensity, liberal, parliamentary or bourgeois forms of democracy. All this will be lodged in an 
understanding of old social movements. We hold these to be single issue movements that fail to 
forge links to other sites of oppression and exploitation, or movements which take on a narrow 
class composition and understanding of change. Implicit in moving on from narrow, and or, 
                                                 
1 Notes from Nowhere Collective, (2003), We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-
Capitalism, London: Verso. Also see Negri, A. & Hardt, M. (2004) Multitude: War and Democracy in the 
Age of Empire, New York: Penguin Press  
2 Castells, M. (1983), The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements, 
London: Edward Arnold Publishers 
3 Murray, M. (1987), South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny, London: Verso  
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Marxist-Leninist positions over class, is the multiplicity of relations humans have within the 
social body. This refutes crude economism conceptions regarding the make-up of the working 
class.4 However, capitalism and our relations to production, still remain central in understanding 
the relationship of the subject to the social body. We suggest recent crisis points and weaknesses 
in capitalism (detected as neo-liberal trends) provide plenty of scope for weaving an historical 
dialectic back in. Evidence for this comes from critical theory which claims, perhaps falsely, to be 
founded on anti-essentialism.5 We argue that it is commodification which breeds this resistance 
against the totalizing effect of capitalism at every level of the structure. Thus neo-liberalism 
embodies for much of this critical thought the subject of a “Fourth World War” fought by the 
multitude. 6 The mobile nature of contemporary capital and the immaterial essence of its 
production to define the multitude – essentially disenfranchised and disaffected subjects – has led 
to an expanded definition of the old working class.7 The multitude is the reinvention of some 
social subject invested in an historical project. This multitude has taken on a particular guise, 
moving away from traditional conceptions of a revolutionary class. As Negri and Hardt note: 
“The closer we look at the lives and activity of the poor, the more we see how enormously 
creative and powerful they are”.8 The poor embody the ontological condition not only of 
resistance but also of productive life itself.9  
 
However, we will also attempt to locate moments within the subject that go beyond the 
indeterminacies and moments of rupture within the structure. Careful attention will be paid to 
Zizek’s subject of lack, in assessing the carnivalesque and irrational moments of today’s 
movements and the role of what we will view as a renewed sense of voluntarism.  
 
We remain conscious that we are forging a vision of new social movements which forges an at 
times uneasy alliance across a variety of groups who challenge dominant structures at different 
times, spaces and ways. It is sometimes tempting to lump various “anti-globalisation” groups 
together, without grasping the intricacies and nuances that bind as well as divide them.10 
                                                 
4 Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, London: Verso 
5 ibid., and Althusser, L, (1979), Reading Capital, London: Verso 
6 Subcommandante Marcos, (2001), The Fourth World War, Chiapas, Mexico 
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/auto/fourth.html
7 For refined conceptions see Callinicos, A. & Harman, C. (1987), The changing working class: essays on 
class structure today, London, Bookmarks 
8 Negri, A. & Hardt, M. (2004), op. cit. p. 129 
9 ibid. p. 133 
10 For an example see Sachs, M. (May 21st - 2004), The Poor Believe in the Poll, Mail and Guardian  
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Ultimately, we accept some of the essentialist critique that can be levelled at NSM theory, 
recognizing a trope of romanticism around struggle is deliberately and necessarily invented. This 
will be fully discussed in the controversial claim that some movements and elements of civil 
society have more validity than others. It will be considered in claiming that moments of 
oppression, subordination and exploitation require articulation and don’t erupt into historical 
trajectories of struggle. This requires the development and expression of relative rather than fixed 
universals (e.g. around democracy, right to water, right to land). It is commodification and neo-
liberalism that provides the stimulus for such relative universals. We shall see that they revolve 
around issues that are real to subjects in the narratives of their struggles and lives.11 Finding some 
fixity of meaning and experience ensures our analysis is not post-structuralist. Post-structuralism 
has fostered awkward relationships with truths which have, as Mamdani has noted, not always led 
to a basis of a “healthy humanism”.12 It leads to a universalized aestheticization whereby truth, 
reduced to merely a style effect of discursive articulation, forges an endless spectrum of 
interpretation/re-interpretation. 13 Moreover, it can be utilized to create legitimacy for fascist, 
colonialist and imperialist discourses. Part 1 attempts to provide the basis for the rest of the work 
by developing an understanding of the historicity of new social movements and what makes them 
different to other forms of political and social organisation. This is critical for later discussion 
which will draw upon the experiences of South Africa.  
 
In Part 2 we seek to build from the radical civil society theory and tease out features and 
characteristics of it within anti-apartheid social movements. This will involve an exploration 
around township civics which were and are often bundled under the umbrella of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF). Many of these were built around notions of People’s Power, economic 
transformation and social justice. We will consider the ideology present in these movements and 
how it played out in realities, acknowledging the highly repressive scenario of the apartheid state. 
Within these movements we will flesh out radical spaces and visions which appeared to have 
dissipated in the ANC hegemony over the decolonisation process and subsequent 
“transformation” project. 
 
                                                 
11 This is not to say that the bourgeois struggle for low intensity liberal democracy is not real, but that it 
seeks in no way to achieve a system based on universal justice.  
12 Mamdani, M. (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
13 Zizek, S. (1989), The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso, p. 32 
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We will not shy away from advocating that there were features within such radical spaces, such 
as Charterist, and or, unity projects, which emerged at various times to create implicitly anti-
democratic politics. 14 Such problems as we will see went to the core of the UDF and also into the 
geo-polities of South Africa which became “ungovernable” in the 1980s. Depoliticization was not 
just a performative effect of ANC strength or “Stalinism” as often narrated by the left, but a 
weakness in the structure and formation of civil society. 15 We explore whether it was not just the 
ANC that “demobilized” the grassroots, but that the form and functioning of civil society that 
contributed to the conditions in which movements’ own radical notions of People’s Power and 
direct democracy dissipated.    
 
Part 3 will look at this demobilization within the context of the transition to democracy during 
the negotiated settlement.16 We scrutinize the nature of the period from apartheid to liberal 
democracy, noting trajectories of struggle which mark both eras. We argue that elements and 
goals in the struggle that sought a very different democracy to that gained at the CODESA talks 
have re-emerged in the deepening disillusionment of the ANC project after ten years of 
governance. This has within some discourse included the ability of the nation-state generally, 
within neo-liberalism, to bring about social justice. Yet, the suggestion that this is the period of 
“economic” rather than “racial” apartheid will need to be carefully explored in the context of 
Fanon’s characterization of national liberation elites.17 While noting the benefit an economic 
approach has in distinguishing the role of dominant classes, we suggest it can overshadow 
explicit structures of racism that penetrate to the core of South African society. They are brought 
out for example by grassroots movements such as the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), in 
their campaign that equated landlessness with racism.  
 
Finally Part 4 examines the extent characteristics we ascribe to the new social movements of 
South Africa correspond with the features of anti-apartheid struggles of the 1980s. Moreover, it 
requires us to assess the critical theory developed in Part 1 in terms of realities in post-Apartheid 
South Africa. We note the apprehension in considering parallels between anti-apartheid struggles 
                                                 
14 For the Charter see, Hudson, P. (1998), Images of the Future and Strategies in the Present, The Freedom 
Charter and the South African Left, in State, Resistance and Change in South Africa, (eds.) P. Frankel, N. 
Pines, M. Swilling, Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, pp. 259-277 
15 See McKinley, D. (1997), The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, London: Pluto Press 
16 Transition might entail shallow processes of transformation but generally structures stay in place. 
Transformation suggests some deeper process around class power, if not a radical overhaul of class 
relations.  
17 See Fanon, F. (1963), The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove Press 
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and current rights based struggles. While there have been a few attempts to make links within a 
continuation of struggle from apartheid to neo-liberalism18, all too often, the anti-apartheid 
struggles that invoked notions of People’s Power have been dismissed as undemocratic, 
authoritarian and reactionary.19 While an attempt to wipe the slate clean might be useful in 
carving out a fresh and dynamic image for contemporary social movements, it perhaps ignores 
that there are similar issues, rhetoric and ideologies being played out today.  
 
We will explore whether the historiography simply seeks to justify and re-create contemporary 
social movements to create ammunition for particular strands of political theory judged to be 
liberationist and correct within the current historical juncture. Are we carving out a fictional 
historicity within the identity of struggle that doesn’t exist? Are narratives created more for 
attachments to a belief in certain “historical” processes than less sharply defined realities? Is the 
multitude, merely Marx’s 19th century industrial working class, vested with an imaginary 
historical project? Noting the background of many individuals involved within the APF (trade 
union, SACP), we need to discuss how they have been placed on a new trajectory of thought 
given the features which define today’s subjects in NSM compared to orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
thought around the revolutionary subject. 
 
We hope a sketch of the past and an analysis of the present may contribute in the current debates 
within the social movements during a critical time for anti-capitalist struggles in South Africa.  
This work is not concerned with producing exhaustive lists of repressive acts conducted by the 
state, the brutality of private security firms, or broken election promises, but in uncovering the 
structure of the post-apartheid state and how social movements respond and re-create themselves. 
Despite their youth, they represent the first serious contestation of ANC hegemony in terms of an 
alternative discourse around democracy, social justice and transformation.20
 
                                                 
18 Bond, P. (2004), South Africa’s Resurgent Urban Social Movements:  The Case of Johannesburg, 1984 – 
1994 - 2004, CCS Report No. 22, Durban, and Desai, A. (2002), South Africa Still Revolting, Johannesburg: 
Impact Africa Publishing  
19 Horowitz, D. (1991), A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, 
Berkeley: University of California Press 
20 For a brief introduction of social movement popular historiography in South Africa see Bond, P. (2001), 
Against Global Apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance, 
Lansdowne: UCT Press and Desai, A. (2002), We Are the Poors, New York: Monthly Press and Naidoo, P. 
& Veriavi, A. (2004), Re-membering Movements: The Trade Union Movement and New Social Movements 
in Neo-Liberal South Africa, Durban: Centre for Civil Society Report 
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This work has been made possible through regular contact with social movements in Gauteng. 
Informal participatory discussions with various activists and communities within these struggles 
have been invaluable and enlightening. Such first hand experience has provided an insight into 
the operative nature and democratic functioning of a variety of movements including the role of 
vanguards and leadership. My attendance at various forums and discussions, such as the Social 
Movements Indaba (SMI), has also been vital.  
 
Fundamentally, the work hinges upon a critical exploration from three areas. Firstly, in the 
discussion necessary to establish a historicity of new social movements which will point to their 
methodological and epistemic construction. Secondly, upon an understanding of the South 
African experience that can cover an immense ground from apartheid into liberal-democracy 
which is aware and responsive to a wide range of historiography. Thirdly, a series of interviews 
and personal reflections from discussions with various activists across South Africa. Some are 
well known leaders. Others form part of the collective multitudes beginning to emerge and speak 
through the fissures of South African society. Relationships that I have made, as well as recent 
political events, culminated in the choices of the Khayelitsha township of Cape Town, Alexandra 
in Johannesburg and Harrismith in the Free State as the sites for this part of the research.21
 
The methodology hinges upon an accurate reflection and assessment of contemporary social 
movements from the people who participate and function within them, together with an 
historiographical account of social movements in the South African experience. Limitations here 
are perhaps obvious. Interviewees may have the tendency to be modest or emphasize their own 
personal role in struggles. Attendance of community meetings and forums is hoped to counter-
balance this together with the use of contemporary subject work. However, there can be no 
objective yardstick by which to judge the contributions found in this paper. Furthermore, the lack 
of rigour within the methodology would alarm the majority of modernist and positivist historians 
and commentators. Yet, it is with this aim that the work attempts to accept the criticisms of 
romanticism, myth, euphoria and narratives in seeking to forge the very conditions outlined by 
Boal in which we might find the same “imagined meeting place” and discussion of freedom. 
 
                                                 
21 Khayelitsha was recently awarded the most violent and unstable place to live in South Africa in Sunday 
Times, 27th October 2004, p. 18. Harrismith and townships throughout the Free State have a long history of 
being “ungovernable” and recently there have been a spate of township uprisings over the poor delivery of 
services. Time spent living in Johannesburg enabled contact with the APF affiliate Alexandra Vukuzenzele 
Crisis Committee (AVCC). 
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PART 1 
                                                     
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT POLITICS: 
THE REVOLUTIONARY SUBJECT 
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Injecting the ‘new’ in social movements 
 
“The real movements that are presently transforming the international order are the new 
alternative social movements. These do not have to be understood as replacing or in opposition to 
the labour movement. Amongst the real movements could also be counted the ‘social movement 
unions’ or ‘new social unionism’ that have explicitly or implicitly, to a greater or lesser extent 
surpassed the ‘economism’ and ‘politicism’, or the reformist or insurrectionary workerism, of 
their predecessors.”22
- Peter Waterman, 2001 
 
Our first task is to assess whether there is a general concurrence of the nature of NSM, as 
portrayed by Waterman above, and as we have laid out in the preface. Outlining the now classical 
Zapatista structure – not as a blueprint – but in order to establish NSM realities and theories will 
be a useful starting point. Although the NSM tag emerged in the early 1980s, typically around 
single-issue movements which opened spaces for transformation, the Zapatistas have been seen to 
embody some of the radical discourse into realities.23
 
The familiar tale of the Zapatista uprising on New Years Day 1994 is that of a response to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agreement and the persistent encroachment of 
large scale cattle ranchers, multinational logging firms and oil companies across Chiapas in 
Mexico. While such narrative correctly identifies the main sites of grievances, it misses the type 
of visionary and proactive nature of Zapatista action. These shape vivid and creative moments of 
resistance and autonomy, and not the reactionary and clumsy tag of anti-globalization.  
 
In the Zapatista movement communities can choose to join municipalities which co-ordinate 
exchanges between them to ensure basic needs are met. The system of delegation from below 
ensures it remains as close as possible to grassroots control and influence over action.24 In theory 
                                                 
22 Waterman, P. (2001), Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, London: 
Continuum, p. 34 
23 For early uses of the label see: Mouffe, C. (1984), Towards a Theoretical Interpretation of New Social 
Movements, in Rethinking Marx, ed. Wolfgang Fritz Haug & Wieland Eifferding, New York: International 
General Publishers 
24 Chiapas Revealed 2001 quoted in Fournier, V. (2002), Utopianism and the cultivation of possibilities: 
grassroots movements of hope, in “Utopia and Organisation”, ed. Parker, M. Oxford: Blackwell,  p. 203 
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power is diffused amongst a series of nodal points, leaving the centre loose and contested. 
However, there is a tension within the movement. Leadership has at various times engaged with 
the government, while at the same time constructed an anti-statist and autonomous discourse. 
Zapatistas have held dialogue with a deadly foe which seeks to exterminate the very gains they 
have made, while at the same time have tried to consolidate their democratic structures across 
Chiapas.   
 
The historiography of the NSM, built on the prototype of Zapatista action, has developed this 
notion of autonomy into a coherent, if perhaps romantic, anti-statist ideology. Brecher et al. state: 
 
“What is being created is a coordinated social movement composed of relatively autonomous 
groupings. It is a structure that differs from either an interest group pressuring the government or 
a party contesting for state power. It eschews a sharp distinction between organizers and the rank 
and file.”25
 
Movements are popularly characterized as networks with an inflected centre. Those who think in 
terms of traditional models may assume it has no organization whatsoever and see mere 
spontaneity or anarchy. Laclau talks of organic intellectuals rather than orthodox leaders and for a 
project “allowing each man and woman to fully assume the responsibility of their own 
contingency and their own destiny.”26
 
Fundamental to the developing a particular strain of revolutionary historicity around the NSM are 
the binding links of solidarity against various forms of oppression and subordination permeating a 
variety of social classes and spaces. Hardin notes how each protest group is initially formed: 
 
“As people recognised in each other frustrations, aspirations and desires to transgress the current 
state of the world. Solidarity is the result of such interactions, the recognition of a ‘we’ out of 
many separate ‘I’s.”27
 
                                                 
25 Brecher, J. Costello, T. & Smith, B. (2002), Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity, 
Cambridge MA: South End Press, p. 86  
26 Laclau, E. (1990), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, London: Verso, p. 196 
27 Jordan, T. (2002), Activism! Direct Action, Hacktivism and the Future of Society, London: Reaktion, p. 
12 
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Laclau notes: “The multiplication of political spaces and the preventing of the concentration of 
power in one point are, then, preconditions of every truly democratic transformation of society.”28
They form chains of equivalence - hegemonic articulations - based around partially fixed 
ideologies. Although as we will discuss in our case studies from South Africa, a lack of resources 
together with state repression towards social movements, and the left generally, makes the critical 
tasks of communication and mobilization extremely challenging. Where the ‘we’ has replaced the 
‘I’, emerges in the resonance between various social classes and components in their articulation 
of forms of subordination around access. We note this in the destruction of pre-paid water metres 
by APF members and the symbolic invasion of land by the LPM. Both are centred upon the 
notion of violation of rights to commonalities (e.g. water, land). Such access held an ambiguous 
position during apartheid. Payment and cost-recovery for basic services such as water and 
electricity was the subject of frequent boycott and dissent. Land was the subject of a massive 
historical theft and formed romantic, but also powerful, conceptions around its reclamation. We 
will need to consider in more depth how services and land failed to institutionalize during the 
transition and first decade of democracy. 
 
The core aspect of radical NSM thought is the critique of capitalism and current crisis points 
which are generally referred to as neo-liberalism. Capitalism has emerged increasingly dominant 
and total at every level, representing a multiplicity of new inequalities and injustices. It usurps the 
remaining commons, destroys diversity and forges homogeneity.29 Negri and Hardt call it a 
“biopower” ruling over life, threatening death and “producing and reproducing all aspects of 
society.”30 Social structures are subsumed by the totalizing effect of capitalism, a process 
characterized as financialization or primitive accumulation.31 Socially, the massive redistribution 
of rewards and the social dislocations entailed by financial expansions tend to provoke 
movements of resistance and rebellion among subordinate groups and strata, whose established 
ways of life are coming under attack.32 Such a system, as we will explore in more depth is Part 3 
does not function in some automated fashion along “free” market mechanisms. That is an illusory 
representation of a system requiring increasing state intervention over security and capital flow. 
                                                 
28 Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985), op. cit. p. 178 
29 Shiva, V. (1997), Biopiracy: the plunder of nature and knowledge, Boston, South End Press 
30 Negri, A. & Hardt, M. (2002), op. cit. p. 94 
31 For financialization see Arrighi, G. (2003), The Social and Political Economy of Global Turbulence, 
NLR 20, March/April pp. 5-71, and for an excellent overview of the role of accumulation see Marais, H. 
(2001) South Africa Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition, 2nd edition, London: Zed 
Books  
32 Arrighi, G, (2003), op. cit. p. 68  
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Some analysis suggests resistance to capitalism is now embodied with resistance to the nation 
state, marking a radical departure from orthodox leftist discourse that has held the state as an 
object of capture. 33
 
However, the anti-statist, autonomous dynamic in NSM historiography tends to overstate the 
capacity and power within the movements. While we celebrate some of the novelties and 
emancipatory possibilities of civil society, other strains of historiography have seen the purpose 
of NSM in an entirely different guise. They develop a narrative of a “healthy” civil society where 
“movements act as the challengers and as ‘maintainers’ of democracy”.34 Indeed, such discourse 
can be located in the majority of international financial institutions (IFIs) which take bourgeois 
civil society and patriarchal social capital organisations as the pillars of liberal democracy and 
good governance.35 When movements step outside of “acceptable” norms, practices and identities 
within the system, their practices are deemed illegal.36 This holds particular significance given 
the draconian legislation threatening civil liberties across the world.37 Whether an organization 
such as the APF is viewed, not as “ultra-left”, but as “terrorist” becomes a real possibility as 
changes within the state unravel, and as social movement groups continue to define their 
resistance and visions of change.   
 
Liberal definitions tend to paint the APF as acting as some kind of brake-stop on the ANC, 
maintaining welfare and social obligations on the state.38 It dramatically reduces the power and 
vision for proactive models and blueprints for alternatives, forging passive subjects who offer not 
defiance but a voice of restraint and moderation. 
 
Thus, the tension in NSM theory between the state and civil society can be seen to replicate the 
very contestation which radical democratic theory demands.39 It can be seen to synthesize in 
                                                 
33 Negri, A. & Hardt, M. (2004), op. cit. and Holloway, J. (2002) Change the world without taking power: 
the meaning of revolution today, London, Pluto 
34 Ibarra, P. (2003), The Social Movements: From Promoters to Protagonists of Democracy in “Social 
Movements and Democracy”, (ed.) Ibarra P. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 12 
35 World Bank, (2002), Building a Sustainable Future: The Africa Region Environment Strategy, 
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realities which produce new networks which we can utilize “to impose new norms on 
corporations, governments and international institutions.”40 Fundamentally, and what has been 
lacking in South African decolonization, is that these new norms are catalyzed into projects of 
transformation and not transition. If social movements are to enjoy success, it means injecting life 
and vitality into the semantics of “justice” and “democracy”. This requires pressure on the state 
(whether it be moral, legal) but also bypassing the state (insurrection, defiance). Yet how can 
such semantics exist and be concrete given the continual contestation and indeterminacy that has 
been applied to the structure in non-essentialist strains of critical thought?41 Can ethical or 
revolutionary discourse really remain open and continually shaped? How would social justice be 
attained? What are the hallmarks of a system that goes beyond low level democracy and seeks to 
forge systems of justice that have meaning not in theories but in experience? What can be the 
“norms” of a radical democratic discourse? In order to build our historicity of the new social 
movement, these are the questions we will need to grapple with in trying to resolve the dialectic 
between theory and reality. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe note that: “democratic struggles imply a plurality of political spaces”.42 
Concurrently they suggest commodification “provokes acts of resistance which launch new social 
actors into the historical arena; and the new actors, precisely because they are moving on a 
dislocated terrain constantly reinventing their own social forms”.43 This suggests there is 
something about commodification which holds properties or structural causalities which are 
intrinsically antagonistic to human nature. The project of the left we are told is to locate itself 
fully “in the field of the democratic revolution and expanding the chains of equivalents between 
the different struggles against oppression”.44 This essentialism which emerges through the back 
door whether it is in Laclau, Arrighi or Negri is perhaps necessary for the survival of the subject 
and the struggle. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
but they also determinedly drive towards the future. Such movements do not judge the present world 
against a blueprint for utopia but against a belief that the world can be different, radically different and that 
they are travelling towards just such a future.”  
40 Brecher, J. Costello, T. & Smith, B. (2000), Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity, 
Cambridge, MA: South End Press, p. 26 
41 Laclau, E. (1990), op. cit and Zizek, S. (1989), The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso 
42 Zizek, S. (1989), op. cit. p. 137 
43 ibid. p. 52  
44 Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985), op. cit. p. 176 
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The principal goal of the movements becomes “the elaboration of a new conception of 
democracy”.45 Sometimes it is referred to as People’s Power, direct or radical democracy, or as 
Brecher et al have coined: globalization from below. They note: 
 
“It is not a set of values or norms peculiar to the movement. The values and goals of globalization 
from below are the same as the rough global consensus articulated in innumerable UN 
documents, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the most recent evaluations of 
environmental and social policy. Globalization from below is a movement to implement these 
widely shared global norms.”46
 
Furthermore, a research report from South African Non-Governmental Organization Coalition 
(SANGOCO) noted:  
 
“The surveys and analysis reported herein indicate that citizens have quite a clear view of what 
they would consider to be a good society. Social justice - including human rights and freedoms as 
well as provision of basic needs and decent living conditions - is necessary for a good society.”47  
 
The role of “universals” (essentially underlying values) within some of the “anti-normative” work 
can also be shown to have common identities with normative discourse especially in terms of 
producing a narrative of ethics. Thus, they are equally susceptible to post-structuralist concerns in 
terms of meta-narrative, historicity and language. Such essentialism and teleology in NSM 
thought, as we will explore in more depth shortly, is necessary for the hope, euphoria and 
narrative of struggle. What we turn to first is how universals play out within struggle, how their 
contestation creates co-option and depoliticization of radical political spaces, but also how they 
are located at the core of new social movement discourse.  
 
Kitschelt notes how subjects involved in anti-institutional practices place effort and investment 
into organizational infrastructure.48 He suggests this makes them, “more concerned with the 
                                                 
45 Della, Porta, D. & Reiter, H. (2004), Police Measures Against the New Global Protest, in The 
Globalisation of Resistance: The State of Struggle, Francis Polet  & CETRI, Pluto Press, p. 112 
46 Brecher, J. Costello, T. & Smith, B. (2002), Globalization, Cambridge MA: South End Press, p. 62  
47SANGOCO (2002), Developmental Civil Society into the New Millennium: The Case of South Africa, 
Johannesburg, p. 3 
48 Kitschelt, H. (2003), Landscapes of Political Interest Intermediation: Social Movements, Interest 
Groups, and Parties in the Twenty-First Century, in Social Movements and Democracy, (ed.) Ibarra, P., 
New York: Pal grave Macmillan, p. 86 
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survival of the collective organization and the protection of the political investment that comes 
with it. 49 According to Kitschelt this becomes a powerful stimulus to contain strategies and work 
within institutional channels, “thus transforming the disruptive movement into an interest 
group.”50
 
Moreover, political entrepreneurs “could never sustain revolutionary socialism in the face of open 
electoral democracy”, and that such an “opportunity structure led to the emergence of reformist 
social democratic parties.”51
 
While these pose valid and challenging criticisms, Kitschelt perhaps presupposes more rationality 
and structure in movements than exists. For example Scott states:  
 
“So long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared we are 
driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life, or that what political 
life they do have is restricted to those exceptional moments of popular explosion. To do so is to 
miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt, and that, for better or 
worse, is the political environment of the subject classes.”52
 
Moreover, where open declaration has taken root social movements appear to take on a variety of 
notions around leadership, concurring with Zapatista models, that seek from the outset to limit the 
amount of control that can be exercised within the movement. Moreover, various forms of 
resource work (self empowering, tools, knowledge workshops etc.) have been deployed in 
spreading a democratic ethic throughout movements. This is no guarantee that such ethics do not 
come to dominate, mirror elitist power structures and replace hierarchies with new ones in the 
same Leninist vanguard manner as older political movements. However, a consciousness and 
sensitivity to democratic structures that nurture pluralism and openness, rather than top-down 
symbolism and rhetoric, is evidence that contemporary movements are addressing some of the 
fundamental structural challenges. It requires, “when speaking of the universal, (that) we make 
                                                 
49 ibid. p. 86 
50 ibid. p. 86 
51 ibid. p. 86 
52 Scott, J.C. (1997), The infrapolitics of subordinate groups, in Rahnema, M, & Bawtree, V (eds.), “The 
Post-Development Reader”, London: Zed Books, p. 323  
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ourselves and our ‘subject position’ visible … to see us as part of an inevitably partial and 
particular contribution to a new kind of internationalism.”53
 
The “pull” factor towards NSM from dominant structures should not be underestimated. 
Corporate arrangements usually accommodate interest groups that have already proven their 
ability to bind constituencies to certain universals. Corporatism is thus a process which responds 
and seeks to “bring in” or “synthesize” interests that already exist.”54 Reports from the last Africa 
Social Forum (ASF) note how Ammara Essy - interim chair of the African Union (AU) 
Commission - extended an invitation to the forum to participate in the AU civil society structures 
with “the clear intention to orient the whole proceedings towards subordinating the social 
movements and other organizations to government structures.”55  
 
When we come to discuss civil society in the 1980s in South Africa, the discrepancies in the 
Freedom Charter (e.g. between socialist and nationalist goals) will be viewed in regard to the 
depoliticizing effect unity can have on radical struggles when such movements become 
consolidated in Frontist or Populist politics.56
 
Some civil society is better than others 
 
“And shouldn’t we ensure that grassroots movements remain ineffective at running states; that 
they remain small, spontaneous, disjointed, and do not congeal into the formation of another 
‘unified version of a better future’, another truth policed by another leader.”57  
- Valerie Fournier, 2002 
 
Scientific claims, like all appeals to the “truth”, are now recognised not as emerging from a 
verificationalist model, but from the dedication of thought to specific paradigms and metaphors. 
They form unique epistemic communities. Universal models of any kind are continuously 
                                                 
53 Waterman, P. (2001), Globalization, London: Continuum, p. 240 
54 Reitzes, M. (1995), How should civil society formations relate to structures of Representative 
Government?. in Humphries, R. & Reitzes, M. (eds.) “Civil Society after Apartheid: proceedings of a 
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South Africa, Johannesburg, 19-20 Sep, p. 101 
55 Hlatshwayo, M. (2004), The African Social Forum: Between Radicals and Reformers, in The 
Globalisation of Resistance: The State of Struggle, Francis Polet  & CETRI,  Pluto Press, p. 206 
56 Hudson, P. (1988), op. cit. pp 259-277 
57 Fournier V. (2002), Utopianism and the cultivation of possibilities: grassroots movements of hope in 
Utopia and Organisation, (ed.) M. Parker, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 209 
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reproducing and discovering their own assumptions in materials, discourse and conclusions. For 
example, in normative developmental discourse ideas around justice and democracy are 
depoliticised through the use of “scientific” and “technical” data which serve to marginalise the 
social and political connotations of neo-liberalism as enacted by the policies of IFIs, the state, and 
government. NSM discourses are constructed around points of felt subordination and oppression. 
As Waterman notes, we should be free about giving out a “subject position”. This requires in 
theory and reality, value judgements as to which forces are hostile and which are conducive to a 
particular epistemic strain of “democracy” or “justice”. Failure to do so culminates in the 
legitimization of a wide range of expressions, many of which may take on problematic positions 
(e.g. fascism or Zionism). The essentialism of a unique historicity is built on the premise that 
certain forms and discourses of civil society are more progressive, just and democratic than 
others.  
 
This forms a paradox when pluralism has been established as a main crux of radical democracy 
by critical theory. SANGOCO’s work on developmental civil society highlights some of these 
ideological conflicts.58 They highlight how some South African organisations did and do not 
support “social transformation” as they see it.59 Citing ratepayers associations (comprising both 
residents and businesses), extremely vocal in the affluent northern suburbs of Johannesburg, 
SANGOCO note how these movements operate to contest “increases in their rates as unfair, 
without recognising the historic apartheid-era subsidy they traditionally received from black 
residents whose places of employment and commercial outlets paid rates to white not black 
municipalities.”60 Some Afrikaaner organisations support the formation of a “Volkstaat”. Other 
civil society groups and think tanks have placed their faith in neo-liberal policies, which have 
already had the effect of reinforcing apartheid-era economic and demographic realities. 
 
Ultimately, an analysis of democracy cannot be located within bourgeois or liberal thought. They 
perpetuate, as we will seek to argue in Part 3, a range of systemic injustices anathema to broad 
conceptions of democracy whether they be those outlined at a macro-level by the United Nations 
Charter, or at a micro-level in the concerns of the Harrismith Residents Committee (HRC).61 
Low-intensity democracy might throw up occasional electoral choices, but leaves a social 
                                                 
58 SANGOCO, (2000), Developmental Civil Society into the New Millennium: The Case of South Africa, 
Johannesburg 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61 As outlined in their memorandum to the mayor of Harrismith, August 2004. 
 20
structure in place dominated and totalized by the vicissitudes of the market. Radical democracy 
and liberationist thought has thus developed valid criticisms around normative approaches. 
However, such thought fleshes out its own set of blueprints and values for attaining justice. Much 
discourse has deconstructed the values and language paradigms of other approaches, but has 
formed their own set of ethics of justice and rights. These become problematic in forming any 
discursive legitimacy for any strain of social movement thought.  
 
Li notes how: 
 
“Civil society has often been prescribed as the irreversible path to democracy and a panacea for 
political repression in authoritarian countries. Those who subscribe to this civil society 
determinism tend to use the term civil society to refer to any private or associational life 
(including productive, commercial, or consumerist activities) existing apart from the state.”62
 
This civil society determinism is commonly found in IFI thought in the structural adjustment 
plans for the “Third World.” However, such determinism can be seen within NSM and anti-
capitalist thought which is not acutely aware that there is nothing intrinsic in the structure and in 
the nature of civil society movements that will struggle for an end to exploitation. Before we 
move on to an exploration of apartheid South Africa it is worth pausing to be clear exactly which 
elements of civil society we are concerned with. Van Wyk’s analysis provides a useful starting 
place: 
 
“In the interest of the democratic project it is imperative for civil society not to become too self-
centred. It should not become a protective shield of “comrades” only, but it should also be 
protective of the broader polity that nurtures and protects civil society. It therefore must be stated 
that, theoretically, civil society in South Africa cannot be reserved for organisations on the 
political left or so-called “struggle organizations”.”63
 
Discussion of the UDF will shed light on he totalitarian practices and politics which Van Wyk is 
referring to. However, a reading of NSM consistent with the type of democratic goals we have 
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outlined must be explicit in its reservation of civil society for certain groups. This cannot be used 
to reinforce top-down structures, populist politics, or be seen as a justification for Stalinism, but 
as the force required to challenge dominate structures and expressions which protect inequality 
and stifle social justice. Van Wyk’s ideas extend to areas of civil thought which see social capital 
as sufficient to meet the needs of people: 
 
 “The argument in favour of building a strong civil society represents a revitalization of the ideas 
of social obligation and limited power. It is in civil society where people can experience the trust, 
empathy, altruism and solidarity that make for social obligations.”64
 
Social capital networks might keep people alive, and hold some of the formative qualities which 
we look for in networks of NSM, but they offer little in terms of vision or alternatives. These are 
the norms around ideas for the function of civil society which we seek to challenge. Horowitz 
notes: “No South African regime will be able to respond to all the demands it will confront, but 
that will not necessarily doom stable democracy.”65 He does so within an understanding that 
grievances, demands and discontent somehow threaten “democracy”. That such a reading reflects 
bourgeois interests mirrors the same elitist fashion in which Samuel Huntington famously 
explored the “danger of democracy” in the 1970s. The majority are written out of decision 
making for challenging the status quo and the nature of the relations of production.66 For 
Horowitz neo-liberal growth is the only way to level blacks upwards to where whites are. 
Challenges to this paradigm are deemed to be a threat to democracy. We argue that resistance and 
expression of a range of grievances form a major role in building democracy. While these 
movements are vulnerable and fragile, and as Fine notes, open to “colonisation from the state”, 
they present visions of democracy that eclipse liberal-democratic thought and transcend current 
systemic relations.67
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Romanticizing the Multitude: Realities of autonomous power and the carnival 
 
“This leads us from discussing the collective solipsism of a pleasure-politics in its full swing to its 
final component: the transformation from solipsism to resistance.”68
- Tim Jordan, 2001 
 
Linked to the politics of globalization from below, is the direct nature of resistance to capitalism 
which has at its core creativity based upon collective consciousness and autonomy. Greater 
significance is attached to a battle in which we use our bodies rather than the violence and 
orthodox tactics of “terrorism” and top-down armed struggle aimed at the revolutionary seizure of 
the state. This in turn evokes notions of movements forged from democratic expressions and 
impulses marking transgression from the closure of many liberation movements of the past.69 The 
extent to which this new revolutionary is the product of the cracks thrown up by the structure, or 
of a subject which has more recourse to some kind of implicit humanity or anti-authoritarianism, 
characterizes one fundamental debate around the momentum for globalization from below. We 
have already suggested that commodification and neo-liberalism have played crucial roles across 
social structures in catalysing anti-capitalist global movements. However, whether subjects have 
any origin of agency, action or voluntarism that goes outside of and/or beyond the structure 
remains one of the key questions regarding social movements. Taking key ideas from Lacan, 
Slavoj Zizek weaves together the final elements into our understanding of revolutionary subjects.  
 
Zizek gets more conceptual mileage out of the structure through an exploration of the 
interpolation process, and the contribution by the subject within it. This involves taking the notion 
of the indeterminate social body from Laclau – where the ruptures of commodofication create 
space for historical actors – but also borrowing from a Lacanian exploration of the traces of the 
subject before “subjectivization”.70 Given that subjectivization is a perpetual motion, the 
elements of the subject within this process must bring or represent something to the subject 
beyond structural causality. Zizek states that the subject’s being is eclipsed by language 
culminating in the subject slipping under or behind the signifier. The subject is submerged by 
language, the only trace being a place marker or holder in the symbolic order.71 The Lacanian 
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71 Fink, B. (1997), The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance, Princetown: University 
Press, p. 52 
 23
subject is either always about to arrive, is on the verge of arriving, or will have arrived by some 
later moment in time.72 The subject has a temporal and fleeting status, marked both behind and in 
front of the signifiers: the bearers of non-being. Zizek develops this idea of what is missing into a 
potentially emancipating project placing the subject in a transcendental corridor between 
signifiers: 
 
“What the revolutionary imposes, however, is not so much the pure coherence of force but rather 
the insistent mechanism of desire”.73   
 
Fundamentally, we look for moments where structure leaves off and subjectivity begins. It is 
Zizek’s notion of the symptom (“the substance of enjoyment”) described as an inert stain and a 
pathological phenomenon laying the basis for something beyond the object within the subject.74 
Beyond interpolation is “the square of desire, fantasy, lack in the other and drive pulsating around 
some unbearable surplus-enjoyment.”75 We see it in the carnivalesque movements of today, the 
notion that we (as subjects of resistance) are everywhere.76 We find it in new forms of media and 
social spaces.77 The construction of societies and communities that challenge the dominance of 
homogeneity, capital and the market in anti-systemic struggles imbued with hope and euphoria. 
 
Yet is this really an accurate description of current trends? Do we not over-estimate the role of 
social movements in their importance and potential? Rucht states: 
 
“As with many so-called new movements in the past, there are also lines of continuity that tend to 
be first neglected but come to the fore particularly when historians begin to dig into the past. I 
would argue that the campaigns witnessed in the last few years are not new in terms of their 
ideological basis, social background of participants, means of mobilization, and tactics.78  
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We are warned not to posit too strong an association between social movements and the rejection 
of bureaucratic forms of organization and of political intermediation.79 In this vein, the same 
party structures, hierarchies and elitism find form and replication in new movements just as they 
did in the past. Diani notes how movement activists “struggle to reconcile their aspiration to 
autonomous and independent action with persistent needs of coordination and decision 
making.”80
 
This leads us to consider the way in which a trope of romanticism has been developed around 
social movements. Do we simply justify and re-create contemporary movements, creating 
ammunition for particular strands of political theory judged to be liberationist and correct within 
the current historical juncture. Are we carving out a fictional historicity within the identity of 
struggle that doesn’t exist? It leads us to judge reactionary elements against the extent to which 
they are visionary. Moreover how accurate are we in attaching homogeneity to social movements 
and the broader leftist movement in the battle against globalization?81 We will argue in Part 4 that 
there are important differences on the “left”, particularly around vanguards and the continuation 
of Marxist-Leninist structures, which should be accentuated rather than de-emphasised given the 
demobilisation that occurred in civil society from the late 1980s. An attempt to wipe the slate 
clean between old and new movements might be useful in carving out this fresh and dynamic 
image for contemporary social movements, but is it truthful? It is perhaps all too easy to detect a 
strength and even a Stalinist tendency within the ANC rather than to identify inadequacies of 
strategy from Old social movements and how they play out in the New. 82  
 
There is perhaps a danger in ascribing a common identity to political leftist movements under the 
banner of anti-globalisation or anti-imperialism when they come to encompass elements which 
have a dubious commitment to democracy and social justice.83 Specific questions related to the 
configuration of these networks and the role played in them by actors with a different structural 
location and different centrality, are rarely addressed.84 However, despite being conscious of 
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these problems within new social movements, the opportunities of a globalization of the struggle 
have injected hope and substance to the belief that another world is possible. 
 
Possibilities for change 
 
“Today’s social movements are seen as playing a central role in producing the world in which we 
live, its social structures and practices, its meanings and cultural orientations, its possibilities for 
change. Social movements emerged out of the crisis of modernity; they oriented themselves 
towards the constitution of new orders, and embody a new understanding of politics and social 
life itself. They result in the formation of novel collective identities which foster social and 
cultural forms of relating and solidarity as a response to the crises of meanings and economies 
that the world faces today.”85
- Antonio Escobar, 1992 
 
Our task is to examine the extent characteristics we ascribe to the new social movements of South 
Africa correspond and break with the features of anti-apartheid struggles of the 1980s. Taking 
from our definition of the fresh dynamic nature of social movements, their “inspirational and 
creative” qualities, we seek to detect how they have taken shape in post-apartheid struggles 
around rights, land and services. 86 It is such struggles in South Africa that have attained the status 
of forging the “cutting edge” of contemporary politics and debates. 87 To what extent is this 
analysis fair and accurate?  
  
We will find continuity between the struggles against apartheid and that of communities resisting 
neo-liberalism, but also important differences within the structure, ideology and dynamics of such 
movements which have once again come to attention from a renewal of grassroots struggle in 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
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Soweto and After 
 
 “Ever since the 1976 township revolts, South African politics has been dominated by urban 
social movements.”1   
- Mark Swilling 
 
There is a consensus across South African historiography that Soweto marked a watershed for 
South African struggles. People excluded from dominant society found the voice, expression and 
defiance which sowed the seeds of resistance that catalysed the urban social movements of the 
1980s. Armed with revolutionary philosophies imbued from Black Consciousness (BC) and 
galvanized by the total rejection not just of Bantu education but of Bantu identity, black South 
African youth shattered any illusions that they were in any way passive subjects of apartheid. 
 
Prior to 1976, there had been considerable exasperation within and towards the banned liberation 
movements (PAC and ANC). They viewed armed struggle as the only paradigm in which the 
racist state could be defeated. Yet, the apartheid system seemed stronger than ever, buoyed on by 
international capital and an array of wealthy and powerful supporters. The internal paralysis of 
the main liberation movements meant they were in no position to provide the vanguard for a 
successful guerrilla war with hundreds of activists detained throughout the 1960s and all 
opposition political activity stifled. Although the Durban strikes of 1973 had rocked Vorster’s 
regime, it was the Soweto township uprising of 1976 which marked the success of collective 
conscious action by a defined group around immediate interests and grievances driven from 
below, rather than party-led politics directed from above. The emergence of BC philosophy had 
been the fundamental component, even if any “realisations” of systematic exploitation, liberal 
(white) paternalism and artificial ethnicity were not new phenomenon suddenly “discovered” in 
the 1970s. Nevertheless, BC thought was gaining in sophistication and currency across a wide 
section of society, taking in all activists who considered themselves anything but White as new 
strategies, tactics and structures sought to overthrow apartheid. Multi-racialism was seen to foster 
and reinforce hierarchical (white-black) relationships, compared to the self-reliance, 
determination and self-liberation connected to BC thinking. The ‘multi-national’ perspective of 
the Congress Alliance gradually lost much of its political resonance as the inspiration and 
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solidarity of BC sliced through the negative connotations of separate organizations of oppressed 
people. Soweto reflected a new confidence and defiance that left both the apartheid regime and 
the liberation movements shocked.2 Moreover, this new political milieu was spurred on by 
regional events as Mozambique attained national liberation in 1975, and the struggle in 
Zimbabwe intensified to reveal the vulnerability of white power in Smith’s regime.  
 
Collectively driven social movements that articulated popular grievances and demands from 
townships, schools, rural communities and the workplace did so “in response to the oppressive 
conditions of daily life.”3 Yet, the vision of these movements (or civics) should not be 
downplayed. Non-racial democracy and rights centred ideology had economic redistribution at its 
heart. Civics took root in the late 1970s, the confluence of worker and community struggles in the 
Eastern Cape, forming particularly vibrant and effective organisations. These new structures 
mushroomed during the early and mid-1980s, at a time the Botha regime was attempting to locate 
township allies for its 1983 Black Local Authorities (BLA) legislation and elections. 
 
By 1983 the civic movement was transformed into a truly mass movement. This transformation 
was led by groups such as the Cradock Residents Association (CRADORA), a group responsible 
for enlisting the vast majority of township residents into the street committees. Thereafter such 
committees proliferated in various townships and became a characteristic feature of civic 
associations throughout the country.4 National liberation began to take on new meanings, moving 
from notions of protracted guerrilla war to autonomous and spontaneous eruptions of defiance 
against the symbols of the regime and towards the destination of People’s Power. This was 
reflected in social unionism as trade unions forged links with community-based struggles.5 
Murray suggests unions such as the Orange Vaal General Workers Union (OVGWU), the General 
and Allied Workers’ Union (GAWU), South African Allied Workers’ Union (SAAWU), and the 
Motor Assembly and Components Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA)* “were 
distinguished by their regional base and active involvement in local-issue campaigns in the 
                                                 
2 Just as they were to the uprisings of 1984.   
3 Rantete, J. & Swilling, M. (1991), Organization and strategies of the major resistance movements in the 
negotiation era, in “Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives”, (eds.), R. Lee & L. Schlemmer, Cape 
Town: OUP, p. 201 
4 Shubane, K. (1991), Black Local Authorities: a contraption of control, in Apartheid City in Transition, 
(ed.) Mark Swilling, Richard Humphries and Khela Shubane, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, p. 73  
5 Webster, E. (1988), The Rise of Social Movement Unionism: The Two Faces of the Black Trade Union 
Movement in South Africa, in Frankel, P. Pines, N. Swilling, M. (eds.), “State, Resistance and Change in 
South Africa”, Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, pp. 174-196 
* A breakaway from the Federation of South Africa Trade Unions (FOSATU) automobile-based affiliate 
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townships”.6 Unions worked with the employed and the unemployed and sponsored township 
campaigns (such as payment boycotts) in forming the impetus for partnerships that secured the 
integration of social unionism in grassroots movements.  
 
The UDF, Civics and People’s Power 
 
“Some critics of civics trumpet divisions (class, ethnicity, gender, generation) and focus on the 
difficulty of achieving a unified community movement. But in our history I believe the AAC 
represented a new dynamic approach. We were able to harness the energetic youth, who helped 
set up structures by which the AAC could function … the people began to ask for, and consider, 
alternative ways of living their lives.”7
- Mzwanele Mayekiso, leader of the Alexander Action Committee (AAC), 1993 
 
On the 3rd September, 1984, the day Botha’s Tricameral Parliament was inaugurated, townships 
across the Vaal triangle exploded in a new wave of defiance and anger. Communities throughout 
the country followed suit as, civic, student and youth groups, sought to mobilise residents against 
the official local government system and in support of other demands based around majority rule 
and economic redistribution. In several townships, BLA’s collapsed and groups set up alternative 
structures to represent residents and, in some cases, to administer parts of the township. By the 
time the state of emergency was declared on the 12th of June 1986, struggle in South Africa had 
reached unprecedented heights.8 By end of the year several thousand people had been detained, 
largely community and student activists, and hundreds were dead. 
 
The United Democratic Front (UDF) had initially been formed to co-ordinate national resistance 
to Botha’s constitutional reforms. Working hand in hand with the Tricameral system in the 
maintenance of apartheid had been the introduction of new forms of local government in the 
townships. BLA’s implemented from 1982 offered a measure of control of the institutions of local 
government to urban communities.9 However, these structures were totally insufficient and 
purely a control mechanism designed to enlist the support of conservative sections of the 
                                                 
6 Murray, M. (1987), South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny, London: Verso, p. 157 
7 Mayekiso, M. (1993), “The Legacy of Ungovernability”, Southern African Review of Books, vol. 5, No. 6, 
Issue 28, Nov/Dec, p. 24 
8 Leading to the belief that South Africa was on the verge of an inevitable Socialist revolution. See Sweezy, 
P, & Magdoff, R, (1986), The Stakes in South Africa, Monthly Review 37, No. 11  
9 Shubane, K. (1991), op. cit. p. 64 
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township communities, contributing to significant class fissure.10 Intense unpopularity, reflected 
in voter turnouts, was soon translated through the civics into a mass campaign to weave local 
resistance and defiance into the national platform of the UDF. 11   
 
The UDF provided organisational and conceptual links between disparate localised struggles and 
the overall struggle for national political change, thereby boosting local-local developments.12 
However, events tended to eclipse the UDF in terms of organization and mobilization, even if 
there was success in forging a Front from a plethora of civil society groups. In terms of gauging 
the township resistance, the UDF like the ANC in exile, remained behind events on the ground. 
The ANCs call for “ungovernability”, made from exile in early 1985 symbolized their own 
surprise at having been caught off-guard by the escalating internal events of 1984 and a need to 
re-align with the masses. It was also not until 1985 that the UDF supported the call for the 
country to be “rendered ungovernable”. Previously they had enacted consumer boycotts with 
mixed success and failed to sway any significant sector of the trade union movement into the 
organisation. Marais considers this initial inaction of the UDF held “grave implications for the 
democratic movement”.13 Yet it symbolized, perhaps, the uneasy relationship between the UDF 
on a national level and volatile local struggles on the ground or workplace. A change in emphasis 
with the rising tempo of events ensured that by early 1986, the UDF had consolidated township 
and civil resistance into its own structures to forge a coherent anti-Apartheid and Charterist Front. 
 
 Seekings calls it “an exhilarating period, with new organisations and protests appearing across 
the country”, and of organisations previously wary of the UDF now joining the sub-regional 
structures.”14 There quickly emerged a vision of building organs of People’s Power in the 
townships. While the UDF was able to exercise little control or direction over the often 
spontaneous expressions of resistance from the grassroots, they tried to cement what was going 
on into a national platform. The revival of the Charter made the UDF the first movement to revive 
the Congress tradition since the ANC had been banned. 15   
 
                                                 
10 ibid. p. 66 
11 For township voter turnouts see Mashabela, H. (1988), Townships of the PWV, Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of Race Relations  
12 Seekings, J. (2000), A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, London: James Curry, p. 
170 
13 Marais, H. (2001), South Africa Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition, 2nd edition, 
London: Zed Books p. 53 
14 Seekings, J, (2000), op. cit. p.175 
15 McKinley, D. (1997), The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, London: Pluto Press, p. 65 
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The UDF was structured at three levels: national, regional and local. The organization claimed its 
democratic nature and credibility from the fact that its operations were stemmed from local 
grassroots organisations which signed up to the Front. Coovadia describes the nature of such 
organisations:  
 
“Civics are local social movements accountable to local communities. They have elected 
executives, formal constitutions, and their organizational structures are based on active grassroots 
participation by their membership.”16
 
With the collapse of the BLAs, such civic associations became the de-facto local civil 
administration in many parts of the country. Murray states that in some cases civics assumed full 
or partial responsibility for the development of school curricula, the administration of justice 
through people’s courts, community policing, rubbish collection, the allocation of licenses for 
businesses, and the granting of permits for housing sites.17 This portrayal of the civics, one in 
which the ideology of People’s Power is hinged upon, is itself contested within Apartheid 
historiography. Certainly the state’s brutal repression made the civics in most parts of the country 
little more than short-term experiments. Although, it is impossible in a study of this scope to gain 
a thorough insight into the many moments of insurrection and hope of the 1980s, it will be useful 
to try and etch out the kind of common experience which shaped this era of struggle.  
 
Mamelodi, 40 km east of Pretoria population is perhaps a microcosm of township resistance in 
the 1980s. With a population of 320,000, Mamelodi was typical of the medium sized townships 
that sprawled across the Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereeniging (PWV). Artificially constructed to 
create a pool of cheap black labour, Mamelodi was one of apartheid’s numerous and infamous 
dumping grounds. Initial uprisings in 1984 that led to the breakdown of the BLA brought the 
terror and security apparatus into Mamelodi, serving to sharpen the focus of civics on further 
insurrection and ungovernability. In the wake of police shootings, various civic groups (among 
them the Mamelodi Parents’ Action Committee, the Mamelodi Youth Organisation, the 
Mamelodi Students’ Congress, the Mamelodi Civic Association and the Mamelodi Women’s 
Group) all of them affiliates of the UDF, set up street and section committees in an attempt to 
organise residents to support demands for the removal of troops from the township. Mashabela 
                                                 
16 Coovadia, C. (1991), The Role of the Civic Movement, in “Apartheid City in Transition”, (ed.) Mark 
Swilling, Richard Humphries and Khela Shubane, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, p. 336 
17 Murray, M. (1994), op. cit. p. 170 
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notes: “It was not clear whether the committees were elected or nominated”, and that although 
“weakened by the emergency regulations, they do appear to have survived them.”18  
 
While details differ from area to area, the ideal of People’s Power emerged around the street or 
yard committee. This structure was an executive of ten to twelve people elected at a meeting of 
all the people on the street, and according to the UDF was “not just those from one political 
tendency”. 19 Again within ideal functioning, street committees would meet at least once a week 
and attend to the social, economic and political issues that emerged in the polity. They sent 
representatives to zone, area or section committees that would represent upwards of twenty-five 
streets. Finally a township civic executive would be chosen at a meeting of all the sections.20 
Certainly some of the rhetoric and ideology behind grassroots forms of democratic expression 
matched the classic NSM theory we outlined in Part 1, and was to provide the backbone for the 
renewal of grassroots activity ten years into “freedom”. 
 
It is worth pausing before we analyse the distinctions between the rhetoric and reality of People’s 
Power to note that it was not the exclusive territory of the UDF (and the ANC). In May 1983, 
shortly after the emergence of the UDF, the National Forum (NF) Committee was formed outside 
of the Congress tradition proclaiming a more leftist, BC direction. Charges that the UDF, which 
had around 200 affiliates, was top-heavy and undemocratic formed the major impetus for the 
organisation. Murray notes that, “While it adopted a strongly-worded Manifesto of the Azanian 
people, it retained a federated structure in which all affiliates continue to operate without 
centralized coordination.”21
 
What distinguished the Forum from the UDF was an avowedly class analysis and identification of 
black working class interests as the mobile, and beneficiary, of genuine liberation. The UDF 
made vague allusions to the working class throughout the 1980s but always retained that the 
struggle against apartheid was a struggle first and foremost for deracialisation. Petit-bourgeois 
tendencies within the UDF formed the crux of outside criticism, which came from the left, which 
also had strong concerns of the “stagism” of the national democratic revolution.22
                                                 
18 Mashabela, H. (1988), op. cit. p. 105  
19 Morobe, M. (1987), “Towards a People’s Democracy: The UDF view”, ROAPE No. 40 December, p. 84 
20 ibid. and Swilling, M. & Shubane, K. (1991), Negotiating Urban Transition: The Soweto Experience, in 
“Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives”, (ed.) R. Lee & L. Schlemmer, Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, p. 235 
21 Murray, M. (1987), op. cit. p. 221  
22 See Hudson, P. (1988), op. cit. for discussion of the SACP and NDR. 
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For example the Cape Action League (CAL) fundamentally rejected the strategy of mobilizing 
the popular masses solely on the basis of opposing racial discrimination. Armien Abrahams, the 
media officer of CAL noted: 
 
“This is the argument of the two-stage position, that once you’ve got an equal franchise all sorts 
of other things become possible. It is deceiving people to claim that mere mobilization against 
racial discrimination is going to bring about national conventions, negotiated agreements. It may 
be that some of this can happen, but it will be for the strengthening, rather than the erosion, of 
capitalism.”23
 
Generally, the preoccupations of the NF mirrored those of the UDF: method and place of 
organization, the nature of links with civic associations and local-level bodies, and the character 
of tactical alliances sponsoring a variety of local or regional mass campaigns. While we will 
suggest that there were groups outside of the UDF who made an important contribution to notions 
of People’s Power, they lacked the popularity and influence the UDF was able to build across 
national and local levels. Although many local civic affiliates of the UDF were often sceptical 
and critical of the national movement, and particularly the intentions of many of its leaders, the 
organisation retained magnetism seeped within the symbols of liberation and a militant image. 
Social movements formed an uneasy alliance with the hierarchical, top-down leadership 
structures in which political discourse was contested. However, the goal of national liberation and 
the sharing of militant and revolutionary symbols and slogans provided unity.   
 
Such magnetism took time to take root within the trade union movements. While the UDF 
received support from the Congress aligned unions such as South African Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU), some of the social unionist factions we have already highlighted were 
unwilling to affiliate during the first years of the UDF. This position was enunciated by the 
Municipal and General Workers’ Union of South Africa (MGWUSA) who had clearly broken 
with the traditional union conceptions of essentialist economism in their article in 1984 as to why 
they would not join the UDF:  
 
“No “working class party” is ever composed only of workers. Anyone who is prepared to fight 
for the kind of fundamental changes that would enable workers to be free would be welcome in 
                                                 
23 Quoted in Murray, M. (1987), op. cit. p. 228  
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any working class party. This also points to the mistake of assuming that all workers are 
somehow automatically committed to the struggle for fundamental change. It is true that a 
progressive political direction can most naturally take root amongst the working class – it is not 
true that a political leadership composed of workers is automatically progressive. Nor is it true 
that a political leadership composed of workers will guarantee that the interests of the workers are 
promoted by that leadership.”24  
 
Certainly the Union had perceived strands within the UDF associated with the Charter that forged 
their deep scepticism as to how the interests of not only workers, but the unemployed, retired and 
so on would be reflected in any UDF victory in South Africa. Although they welcomed the 
formation of the UDF in the battle against apartheid, their analysis of the goals of struggle politics 
prevented affiliation: “We believe that it is impossible to separate off Apartheid from the 
capitalist system it has fed. A truly committed opposition to Apartheid (and its consequences) 
will lay the foundations for a fundamental change in the entire system of South Africa.”25 
Nevertheless, many of the social unionist movements were to subscribe to the organisation during 
the turbulent years of the mid 1980s, and community based Unions played an important role in 
stay-aways, strikes, boycotts within a variety of local movements that were affiliated to the 
UDF.26 Again the dialectic between the national movements, its leaders and the activities on the 
ground saw “ungovernability” driven from the bottom-up and only incorporated in leadership 
rhetoric afterwards.  
 
South Africa had a strong tradition of industrial workerist and syndicalist leaning Unions. The 
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) stressed the creation of democratic, 
factory-based structures around the principles of worker control and accountability of 
leadership.27 These elements of union activity were also critical of the reformism and class 
analysis of the UDF. However, the formation of a broader Union movement was to provide the 
important catalyst in changing this. While the trade union left shifted the focus of opposition from 
rhetorical challenges to the apartheid state to nurturing autonomous social institutions in civil 
society, the pace of events combined with larger questions around political power created a 
                                                 
24 Municipal and General Workers’ Union of South Africa (MGWUSA) on the UDF (1982), SALB 9 no. 2, 
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milieu in which Unions were pushed into assimilation. As the dialectic unravelled it was 
presented as choice of ‘political’ or ‘non-political’ unionism. 28 Fine notes: “This was really no 
choice at all: it meant the assimilation of the unions into the political frame of the national 
liberation movement and the suspension of any ‘third road’ project.”29
 
Thus the Union unity talks initiated in 1981, until the formation of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) on 29 November 1985, created an important ally for the UDF. The 
UDF had stated in 1982 that: “It would be easier to take decisions and to take action if the trade 
unions had already established themselves into a single federation.”30 Certainly COSATU, as 
fragile as it was in the first years, was a welcome boost to the growing constituency of the UDF  
 
Rhetoric, reality and ideology of People’s Power 
 
“The time for shouting socialist slogans is over. The time for implementing socialist programmes 
is now.”31
- Jay Naidoo, Free Mandela rally in Mitchell’s Plain (1986) 
 
Leftist critique of the UDF has tended to concentrate on the concerns we can see outlined by the 
MGWUSA. That the nature of the organisation might result in a conciliatory movement and onto 
a trajectory of elite-pacting whereby dominant classes and structures would retain their position 
and strength, to the detriment of the interests of South Africa’s masses, has clearly been identified 
by many analyses of the UDF and the Congress Alliance from mid 1980s.32 In New Year of 
1986, ANC and UDF leaders met in Stockholm, with the ANC instructing the UDF to “expand 
the democratic movement among white South Africans.”33 By 1987 McKinley asserts that “the 
UDF leadership was now focusing substantial attention and organisational energy on wooing 
white capital and political liberals bore testimony to the defeat of any genuine notion of an 
insurrectionary implementation of People’s Power.”34  
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The narrative of the usurping of grassroots struggles by leadership elites neatly explains a 
narrative of betrayal carried out by the leadership of the Congress Alliance and their petit-
bourgeois interests. While the possibility of an insurrectionary seizure or transformation of power 
was fundamentally undermined by the strategic vision and practice of an externalised liberation 
movement, did local struggles really lay the foundation for the potential extension of grassroots 
empowerment and a vision of transformation centred on a materially located struggle?35 This 
requires us to look at the interests of the leadership before assessing what features of the local 
movements we might be romanticising in the realities of People’s Power and grassroots 
movements. For if such visionary movements and a culture of democracy had taken root across 
South Africa, how was economic redistribution so obviously ignored in the eventual South 
African transition, and not transformation, to “democracy”? Were there not features within local 
movements, many of them mirroring national and vanguardist party structures that paved the way 
for their own demobolization together with the nature of a populist alliance.  
 
Lodge defines three streaks within the leadership of the UDF: nationalist, national democratic and 
socialist.36 Certainly the Socialist leadership held much prominence within the organisation and 
its propaganda. Such rhetoric was vital in countering claims from civil society and working class 
groups that the UDF was reformist or petit bourgeois in nature. Morobe provides a typical 
position of the left in the UDF: 
 
“When we speak of majority rule, we do not mean that black faces must simply replace white 
faces in parliament. A democratic solution in South Africa involves all South Africans, and in 
particular the working class, having control over all areas of daily existence ... This for us is the 
essence of democracy. When we say that the people shall govern, we mean at all levels and 
spheres, and we demand that there be real, effective control on a daily basis.”37
 
However, the unswerving adherence of the UDF to the Freedom Charter and to the notion of the 
national democratic revolution meant any socialist or radical aims were always open to 
contestation by liberal and bourgeois thought, particularly that within the leadership circles of the 
ANC in exile.38 This stems from the necessary recognition that the Freedom Charter 
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“accommodates the aspirations of a broad range of groups; small businessmen, professionals, 
peasants, and of course, workers”.39 Thus while the UDF made frequent reference in its rhetoric 
to the clause in the Charter which stated that “The People Shall Govern”, it wasn’t clear which 
“people” they meant and in which way. The Charter, rather than forging a set of universals that 
could carry forward a blueprint based upon economic and participatory democracy, was located 
in a 1950’s reading of British socialism, parliamentarism and welfarism.40  Peter Hudson’s 
elaboration on FOSATU’S concerns of the Freedom Charter fleshes out the danger a common 
Front around a Charter could have if it did not firmly commit to certain principles and positions 
which would be non-negotiable.41 Moreover, there was nothing intrinsic within the 
accomplishment for the first part of the national democratic revolution (ending racialized 
apartheid) for the next to take place (socialism). Indeed, by opening up contestation from a 
variety of perspectives in the quest to destroy apartheid first, deal with capitalism later, worker 
and social movement interests could be seriously undermined in a war of position with dominant 
structures and classes in some form of negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, the document was 
enormously popular amongst South Africans, many of whom held great expectations about the 
transformative effects the Charter would enact. It was a potentially useful document for the 
grassroots movements if it could be implemented in justice based visions. Yet, liberal or 
bourgeois control of the Freedom Charter threatened the deep transformative qualities it might 
yield.      
  
UDF ideology came to focus on the political goal of removing Apartheid, leading to the 
assumption that the dismantling of the Apartheid state would lead to a free, democratic united 
South Africa with the question of class domination by the bourgeoisie negated. There was little or 
no attempt to develop a sophisticated class analysis of the society and to illustrate inequalities, 
domination, poverty and unemployment that ran at a racial and economic level. As Silver and 
Sfarnas noted in one of the first critiques of the UDF, their primary impulse flows from “the 
belief that race is to be concentrated upon as the most overt form that domination takes in South 
Africa.”42
 
The consolidation of a range of interests, most of whom had a goal of going beyond removing the 
political system of apartheid, into a movement that was vulnerable to bourgeois and liberal 
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interests provokes, as we will see in Part 4, important questions to activists in today’s South 
Africa around the purpose and function of the Social Movements Indaba (SMI). 
 
We now turn to the question of features implicit at the local level of UDF affiliation and the 
nature of People’s Power. As Lodge states: “Any analysis of the UDF, though, should not be 
limited to the bureaucratic boundaries of its often patchy organisation, for the UDF functions 
more in the fashion of a social movement than a deliberately contrived political machine.”43
 
We cannot possibly hope to attain anything that comes close to an intricate analysis of the 
moments, spaces and visions of People’s Power. Instead we seek to explore the milieu of social 
movement politics of the 1980s on the basis of Marais’ suggestion that for “a while, the variety 
and sweep of initiatives, broadly gathered under the canopy of the anti-apartheid struggle, offered 
hints of Giles Deleuze’s concept of rhizomatic phenomena: a flowering of autonomous activities, 
linked laterally and not subjugated to hierarchical ideological and strategic conformity.”44  
 
While we have noted the surprise in which the external liberation movements witnessed the initial 
townships rebellions, it was not long before much political capital was being made out of the 
widespread insurrections of the 1980s. The ANC publication Sechaba asserted that: 
 
 “In the Eastern Cape, the Reef, some areas of Natal and in the Orange Free State, whole districts 
have been liberated by the people, and both civic government and administration of justice have 
become the business of the people.” 45
 
It was through these civic organisations that people have, we are told, “at last discovered” direct 
participation in democratic life and are busy “developing political self-responsibility.”46 That the 
masses had somehow “discovered” their historical purpose underpinned the continued 
hierarchical approach the ANC in-exile held for the seizure of state power and the active (but 
ultimately passive) role of the subject within it: “These organs of People’s Power should be 
regarded as historically inevitable, as they are clearly destined to be the embryos of our future 
democratic state.”47
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The role of “dualism”, between local and national groupings of power was to use the ANC’s 
terminology “inevitably” weighted on one side. While the “whole conception of People’s Power 
at this stage is decentralised and autonomous nation-wide People’s Communes”, it relied upon the 
implementation of “the Freedom Charter”.48 We are told these moments take part in some higher 
revolution, in a highly centralized seizure of power.49  
 
However, even in the most militant townships the ‘dual power’ situations detected by 
insurrectionists could be more accurately described as ‘ungovernable’, reflecting not the usurping 
of power but its dispersal.50 It has been suggested that political activity had as much to do with 
“constructing organisational hegemony and addressing local grievances, as it did with seeking to 
bolster a nascent national revolution.”51 This leads us to question whether Comrades corroded the 
direction and space opened by movements for the sake of maintaining ideological hegemony 
around the struggle. 
  
 
It is interesting to note criticism that arose after the first UDF mass meetings and workshops: 
 
“By selection of group leaders and with undue attention being paid in the report backs to minority 
opinions within the group, workshops function either to paralyse decision making or else to 
reinforce our opinion that very often these meetings are used to rubber stamp decisions taken 
elsewhere.”52  
 
Moreover there was criticism of single-issue civic groups and campaigns:  
 
“Their programs are generally limited, e.g., agitation around the issue of rents without drawing 
out clearly the link to wages and hence economic exploitation at the site of production.”53
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Part of our critical theory in Part 1 outlined the linking up of a series of sites of oppression in the 
creation of a common meeting space towards transformation. Perhaps this early criticism of the 
UDF proved to be an unfair one given some of the space was to open up in certain spatial 
localities. Other observers of township politics have suggested that:  
 
“When township street committees sprung up in 1984-86, they took one of two forms; either 
partisan differences were ignored or one organization took charge of the area and forcibly 
excluded all rivals.”54
 
Such an analysis is far too simplistic and ignores the ideological underpinnings and nuances that 
played out across local levels. The Alexandra Action Committee (AAC) formed to unite residents 
after clashes between UDF and BCM.55 While the peak of their operation lasted a few months, 
struggles played out against a background of rights to housing, education and services and the 
most intense state repression.  
 
In 1981 the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) failed to mobilize the community in support of a 
call for a rent boycott to protest against increased tariffs and various local political grievances. 
However, by 1985-6 a fresh leadership style was evident from the efforts of a new layer of youth, 
working class, and intellectual leaders opposed to the old elitist methods.56 The SCA welcomed 
all: ANC, BCM and PAC. Yet this did not mean that it was apolitical. Its leadership, media and 
messages at meetings constantly emphasized the link between socio-economic problems and the 
structure of political power.”57
 
Neither the UDF nor the ANC could claim the credit for the formation of street committees and 
other manifestations of People’s Power, but sought like other groups to further a particular 
political project. In the brutal and violent context of repression, utopian ideals and spaces were 
easy victims for the justice meted out by comrades in the desire for a homogenous and undivided 
front against apartheid or the settling of scores within local power politics.58
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Any analysis of 1980s South Africa should be grounded in an understanding that many of the 
ideological and practical differences that appeared significant during the relative freedom to 
organise of the period 1980-85, appear much less so to organisations on the run. Practical 
problems of pursuing campaigns, as well as sheer survival, displaced ideological conflicts.59
 
The imposition of a nationwide state of emergency in June 1986 ushered in a period of severe 
state repression that substantially constrained the level and especially form of township protests.60 
The regime decided to shore up the BLAs by force if need be. 26,000 people were detained in 
1986 and Soweto was the only township where the committees openly survived.61 Ungovernable 
moments of disrupture and insurrection continued, with and without “organisation”, to shape the 
final years of Apartheid South Africa.  
 
Mayekiso has taken issue with those academics, the majority of whom were white, who have 
criticised the people’s war for its violence and bad political practice: 
 
“The potentially revolutionary situation during this period was based on a popular association of 
apartheid with capitalism, not simply with a lack of civil rights. It is our response to this condition 
that must be clearly understood if the first democratic government aims to achieve social 
stability.”62
 
Thus, even if struggle took brutal forms, they were nothing compared to the violence and 
inequalities endemic within the whole system of capitalism. Economic democracy and 
redistribution was fundamentally linked to any future stability, countering the position 
exemplified by Horowitz, which equated democracy with bourgeois control. 
 
Mayekiso elaborates on the lessons yielded by the 1980s: 
 
“For those of us committed to a vibrant post-apartheid civil society, the mid-1980s also taught us 
what we know about politics: how to organize, how to bring structural analysis to bear, how to 
contest both geographical and ideological turf, and how to build a national democratic movement 
                                                 
59 Catholic Institute for International Relations, (1987), South Africa in the 1980s: State of Emergency, 4th 
edition, Nottingham: Russell Press, p. 42 
60 Seekings, J. (1991), Township Resistance in the 1980s, in “Apartheid City in Transition”, (ed.) Mark 
Swilling, Richard Humphries and Khela Shubane, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, p. 291 
61 Mashabela, H. (1988), op. cit. p. 5  
62 Mayekiso, M. (1993), op. cit. p. 28 
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featuring economic justice. We make no apologies for doing all this in the context of 
‘ungovernability’.”63
 
For it was these groups who bore the brunt of reactionary forces to any change. Certainly any 
analysis of liberation groups during a period of Intifada needs to be grounded in the extreme 
conditions resistance faces. But what tactics and strategies can be justified? Can democracy be 
built by means which take on an increasingly undemocratic form? Throughout history the 
violence meted out against individuals and movements challenging dominant classes, ideology 
and interests, needs little elaboration. The question for new social movements, just as it was for 
the civics, is how to reinvent struggle under the most testing oppression without mirroring the 
hierarchical, top-down and elitist structures which they have challenged and recognised as the 
root of the problem.  
 
In the second half of 1988, there was evidence of the re-emergence of anti-apartheid 
organisations in Soweto. Student activists called boycotts at some schools, youth activists acted to 
prevent the council evicting rent defaulters whose houses had been sold, and street committees 
were operating.64 These grievances and demands of certain rights provide the continuity of 
struggles against apartheid to struggles against neo-liberalism. 
 
Ultimately it was as Seekings summarised “deemed more important to ensure that the Front was 
effective than that it be democratic.”65 We note that some of the features of South African 
liberation politics of the 1970s/80s opened up new radical political terrain, creating spaces and 
visions which dissipated within the ANC’s hegemony over the nature and form of social 
transformation. The local strength of civic organizations rested primarily on their campaigning 
over locally and immediately important grievances and their appeal diminished when they 
neglected this.  
 
Progressive UDF rhetoric such as: “Our democratic aim therefore is to control every aspect of our 
lives, and not just the right (important as it is) to vote for a central government every four to five 
years”, gave way to co-option and compromise as it became embroiled in power politics. 66 At the 
                                                 
63 Mayekiso, M. (1993), op. cit. p. 23 
64 Mashabela, H. (1988), op. cit. p. 146  
65 Seekings, J. (2000), op. cit. p. 190 
66 UDF (1987), Towards a People’s Democracy: The UDF view, p. 83  
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same time the vague nature of the Freedom Charter enabled a variety of groups to justify certain 
positions within the Charterist movement. 
 
Resistance in the form of social movements was shaped by the spatial confines of the townships. 
It many ways it tended to perpetuate the urban/rural divide and the artificial dichotomy that 
existed from relations under colonialism.67 Such an emphasis, and one that has been reflected in 
our exploration thus far, negated the role of rural land struggles. The challenge of identities, the 
narrative of land reclamation, and the struggle of exploited farm labour never received the 
attention that the insurrection and ungovernability of the townships and their civics received. 
However, and as we will explore later in the week, land was to become one of the most crucial 
issues leading up to and after 1994. It reflected the “right” to land that punctuated the discourse of 
social movements, and which gripped the aspirations of farm labourers and workers across the 
country. 
 
Radical spaces that occurred outside state structures in the 1980s did so in anti-capitalist visions 
of access to land, housing and services. That these were not institutionalized during the South 
African transition, has only served to contribute in many respects to a renewed focus of struggle 
and resistance: from apartheid to neo-liberalism. 
                                                 
67 Alexander, A. (2004), op. cit. 
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The Great Betrayal or National Democratic Revolution? 
 
 “The nationalisation of the mines, banks and the monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC, 
and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable.”1  
- Nelson Mandela, February 1990 
 
The debate regarding the transition, from apartheid to democracy, bears the most crucial 
questions in South African society ten years after the first elections. The first decade of 
independence has left activists and those enjoying citizenship for the first time to ponder: “What 
was the struggle for”? Moreover, interpretations of the transition in South Africa are important in 
the sense that they give direction, impetus, experiences and shape to the project of transformation 
and future development. That transformation is imperative in a society wracked by excruciating 
poverty, dispossession and violence is agreed upon by all developmental discourse. But let us 
begin by fleshing out two diametrically opposed viewpoints of how South Africa “decolonized”. 
 
The Great Betrayal 
This position suggests that the ANC leadership negotiated a flawed agreement with the 
Nationalists, and were lured away from any socialist principles they might have held into a 
process of elite-pacting which sold-out the masses. Today the inequalities and injustices of 
apartheid have been reinforced by the subsequent class project that the ANC has pursued. That is 
the creation of a black bourgeoisie and enrichment programme for those with access to a new 
patriarchy, which has formed common interests with IFIs and capital. This has ensured important 
domestic and international allies remain onside while revolutionary identity, symbols and culture 
gives the ANC a strong social base amongst the masses. However, this popularity belies an empty 
rhetoric, as policy documents such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
have been deconstructed as the Ramaphosa Delivery Programme in the great betrayal of the 
liberation struggle.2
 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Murray, M. (1994) op cit. p. 19  
2 Cyril Ramaphosa (once Chairperson of NUMSA) is popularly seen as making the Unions in the 1980s 
only to break them a decade on.  
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National Democratic Revolution  
Alternatively there is the narrative that the ANC secured a peaceful transition to democracy in a 
political milieu which threatened to spiral out of control and create a civil war in the country, with 
potentially devastating consequences. The legacy of apartheid is slowly coming undone as macro 
economic policies forged upon limited investment and trickle-down economics create growth in 
previously deprived areas. According to this view, tough and challenging global markets and 
influence of neo-liberal economics, limit the policies available to the government who have to 
play a tight game between maintaining stability and redressing apartheid. Therefore growth rather 
than redistribution has been opted for as the catalyst of social justice. This is expected to 
gradually take root in some of the poorest communities in South Africa. Some within this 
paradigm see it as a period of consolidating “working class” power in a stagiest conception of the 
national democratic revolution which will ultimately lead to socialism.3 Moreover, South Africa 
seeks to use its generally positive international status to pressure institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and the G8 countries, for a better deal for Africa and the “Third 
World” as a whole.  
 
Ironically those who call themselves Marxists adhere to both positions. However, most 
interpretations are lodged somewhere in between. For example, most critiques of the ANC 
negotiated settlement tend not to underplay the immense pressure of international and domestic 
capital.4 However, our task is to tease out an understanding of the transition to democracy that 
can be of value in terms of assessing the relationship of the state with civil society. We will find 
accommodation for both NDR and Great Betrayal perspectives. Through that we hope to unravel 
questions and critiques, which apply to social movements in the context of continuing struggle for 
social justice and the systemic forces of government and market forces.  
 
We begin with an overview of civil society during the early 1990s placed in the context of the 
negotiated settlement. The notion that the ANC did its best with limited choices will require us to 
look at neo-liberalism and systemic trends within international capital generally to assess what 
and if alternatives existed. This might yield some starting points for perceiving roles and forms in 
which current movements may pursue anti-capitalist agendas.   
 
                                                 
3 For further reading on the SACP see Thomas, D. (Forthcoming), Hegemonic Struggle in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa: the Role of the South African Communist Party (SACP), PhD Dissertation at Queens 
University, Canada   
4 Marais, H. (2001), op. cit.  
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Depolitization after Apartheid 
 
The dying days of apartheid marked the dramatic re-emergence of civil society. Under the junta-
like conditions of the mid to late 1980s, civil society had largely dissipated across the country.5 
Yet, by the end of 1990, campaigns aimed at the resignation of councillors had led to the collapse 
of 40 per cent of the countries 262 BLAs, and had revived the restiveness which characterized the 
townships in the mid-1980s.6 Rantete and Swilling stated with some optimism in 1990 that 
around 300 civic associations were operating countrywide.7 However, as the negotiations towards 
a post-Apartheid South Africa took shape, civil society underwent a re-assessment of goals, 
strategies and identities.  
 
Most commentary saw that, in one way or another, the return of civil society was a crucial asset 
to the aspirations for a democratic transition and transformation. Yet, these conceptions were far 
from homogeneous. Stephen Friedman, Director for the Centre of Policy Studies (CPS) at this 
time, noted: 
 
“One way of reducing the potentially destabilizing effect of partly unfulfilled expectations is to 
break the pattern in which the impoverished (and, at present, voteless) see economic 
improvement as something bestowed upon them by leaders. “8
 
Friedman’s argument took the logic that bringing in as many civil society groups into decision 
making as possible would make feasible the important concessions that would have to be made to 
attain peace. “The result will be not only to broaden democracy but to increase prospects for 
voluntary support for difficult compromises.”9 Civil society began to take on a paradigm by 
which it could form corporate agreements for their own interests and perhaps establish more 
autonomy from top-down, symbolic politics in the future.  
 
Mayekiso stated: 
 
                                                 
5 Soweto as we have already highlighted remained an exception. 
6 Shubane. K. (1991), op. cit. p. 72 
7 Rantete, J, & Swilling, M. (1991), op. cit. p. 203 
8 Friedman, S. (1991), The National Party and the South African transition, p. 191 
9 Friedman, S.  (1992), Beyond Symbols? The politics of economic compromise, in “Wealth or Poverty? 
Critical Choices for South Africa”, (ed.), Robert Schrire, Cape Town: OUP, p. 619 
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“A post-apartheid social movement, in seeking to engage with the new democratic local 
government, has to develop new methods of organisation in order to engage and cooperate or 
collaborate with the state.”10
 
The incoming state was seen as the catalyst for Peoples Power, if it could be given the right kick-
start by the civics. Similarly COSATU found “corporatist deal-making, represented essentially 
tactical compromises that in no sense jeopardized the pursuit of system-transformative ends and 
socialist goals”.11
 
More militant groups in civil society continued to engage in various forms of defiance against 
symbols of the state.12 This was no doubt influenced by a belief in the increased bargaining 
strength such actions would have in the future, but equally as plausible is that such movements 
were articulating sets of demands that would be implicit to their visions of future systems of local 
governance (such as service delivery).  
 
Civic groups faced an identity crisis as a new national discourse of working with, rather than 
against, the future state took root across the country. Friedman suggested “many civic activists 
are far more comfortable with the old role than the proposed new one.”13 Dissonance to co-
operation with the new state seemed to be largely symbolic and hollow. 
 
PAC policy documents from June 1990 condemned negotiations as aimed at the protection of the 
“entrenched economic interest of the ‘European capitalist settlers’ and the co-option of the 
African petty bourgeois and elites into the capitalist system.”14 Moreover, it noted, “reliance on 
external missions of the liberation movement has undermined local initiatives by the Azanian 
people to liberate themselves.”15 A few years earlier the ANC’s mouthpiece Sechaba had taken 
the same line. In an article titled “Dual Power”, Mashinini noted: “it goes without saying that 
these embryonic organs of power have to be strengthened, consolidated and developed [for] when 
                                                 
10 Mayekiso, M. (2003), South Africa’s Enduring Urban Crisis: The Local State and the Urban Social 
Movement with Particular Reference to Johannesburg, in “Confronting Fragmentation: Housing and Urban 
Development in a Democratising Society”, (eds.), Harrison P., Huchzermeye, M. & Mayekiso, M. Cape 
Town: UCT Press, p. 59  
11 Murray, M. (1994), op. cit. p. 162 
12 Shubane. K, (1991), op. cit. p. 72. These continued into the first post-Apartheid government around 
payments and boycotts.  
13 Friedman, S. (1992), op. cit. p. 617  
14 Rantete, J. & Swilling, M, (1991) op. cit. p. 218 
15 Quoted in Rantete, J. & Swilling, M. (1991), op. cit. p. 218 
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that moment arrives, [they] will be called upon to rise, arms in hand, and seize power.”16 That a 
peaceful settlement might be the only solution to end Apartheid was referred to as an “awful 
scenario”.17
 
Yet the negotiated settlement began to reflect the desires just as much as fear of millions of South 
Africans. There can be no doubt the negotiations were spurred on by events in the Soviet Empire, 
as well as the lure of power to certain individuals. However, the genuine belief that a settlement 
could lead to a thorough and fair transformation of South African held resonance across anti-
apartheid groups, as an outline of a new order appeared on the horizon.  
 
Thus a lot hinged upon the relationship civil society would have with the Congress Alliance and 
how its visions would be incorporated into new policies. Overall, civic leaders reached a broad 
consensus not to simply collapse their organizations into emergent local ANC branches.18 Behind 
the discussions, events on the ground were already shaping the role of future civil society form in 
a free South Africa. The political thaw left civic organisations to decide the extent they were local 
structures concerned with local problems, or were part of national formations concerned with 
constitutional issues. As negotiations around national socio-economic issues became increasingly 
within the ambit of the ANC, the UDF imploded and civic organizations concentrated on local 
problems in which the energies of a new state could be directed.   
 
As they grew stronger, and with successful campaigns leading to the disintegration of many of the 
maligned BLAs, civics faced a more daunting decision: should they engage in concrete 
bargaining on material issues with local authorities? For some coercion by white councils, 
particularly those run by the Conservative Party (CP), played its part as councils happily slashed 
water and power supplies as a form of political pressure during rent and service payment 
boycotts.19 In Soweto where civil society had a strong history, negotiations appeared fruitful in 
some of the provisions they yielded. The SCA put forward a policy framework for a non-racial 
and democratic urban alternative that was eventually accepted by all the stakeholders.20 This 
included writing off over R500 million of arrears, and the creation of a metropolitan chamber 
(MC) whose mandate would be to dismantle the apartheid urban system by making sure that “an 
                                                 
16 Mashinini, A. (1986), Dual Power and the Creation of People’s Committees, Sechaba, April, p. 28 
17 Mashinini, A. (1987), Dual Power (II) and the creation of People’s Committees, Sechaba, May, p. 2  
18 Murray, M. (1994), op. cit. p. 170 
19 Bond, P. (2004), South Africa’s Resurgent, p. 18 
20 Swilling, M. & Shubane, K.  (1991) op. cit. p. 225 
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appropriate new system of local government and administration for the region (is) established”.21 
It led some to see the Soweto experience as a prototype of what could be achieved by elevating 
social movements as key players within decision-making. 22
 
But Soweto proved to be the exception in the 150 or so negotiations that social movements 
entered into with local authorities at this time.23 As Friedman notes, “many civics are far too 
weak to negotiate concrete deals on urban policy or resources – indeed, many are little more than 
collections of activists.”24 Many local authorities were unwilling to engage in the visions civics 
had for non-racial polities and the investment needed for historically deprived areas.25 Moreover, 
they soon found their terrain infringed upon by the ANC. Coovodia makes the important 
observation that: 
 
 “There have been occasions when a political organization such as the ANC has entered into 
negotiations about services on behalf of the community but without consulting the civic 
concerned. There have been instances where rent boycotts have been called off by the ANC, 
again with no consultation with the civics. A recent ANC statement, which disavows boycotts of 
bond repayments, undermines the ability of grassroots communities to put pressure on financial 
institutions which are centrally involved in the provision of privatized housing.”26
 
That this had severely detrimental consequences for grassroots movements needs little 
explanation. People were being detached from their roles as central proponents in their struggles. 
Questions around institutionalising the right to services as a commonality, the payment of rent in 
substandard housing, and the formation of just and redefined non-racial polities drifted out of the 
hands of autonomous organisations rooted in anti-capitalist politics to the negotiations at 
Kempton Park. 
 
Within this context the UDF had become an increasingly irrelevant organisation. Peter Mokaba, a 
leading member of the UDF and President of South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) argued, 
“the UDF has no distinct platform apart from that of the ANC … It has adopted the Freedom 
                                                 
21 Quoted in ibid. p. 223 
22 ibid. 
23 Bond, P. (2004), South Africa’s Resurgent, p. 18  
24 Friedman, S. (1992), op. cit. p. 617  
25 Bond, P. (2004), South Africa’s Resurgent, p. 18 
26 Coovadia, C. (1991) The Role of the Civic Movement, in “Apartheid City in Transition”, (eds.), M. 
Swilling, R. Humphries and K. Shubane, Cape Town: OUP, p. 346, and Shubane, K. (1991) op. cit. p. 74 
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Charter as a principle … Its membership must become part of the ANC … Now that the ANC can 
operate legally, the UDF is redundant.”27 Amid criticisms that the UDF had become an over-
centralised and top-down structure representing the interests of a small cabal (not new criticisms) 
and the site of an internal political struggle for power, collapse of UDF structures was crystallized 
by the departure of its leaders into the ANC. 
 
By February 1991 disillusionment with the Front led to the creation of the National Interim 
Civics Committee (NIIC), by groups openly hostile to what they perceived as a reformist and 
centralist UDF, and by those sceptical to the negotiations. While the remnants of the UDF 
leadership found new homes in the ANC, another Front emerged to fill the space of a Charterist 
aligned civics organization. The launch of the South African National Civic Association 
(SANCO) in March 1992 marked a decisive step in the consolidation and amalgamation of the 
civic movement.28 The transformation of the civic movement from a loosely federated body of 
autonomous affiliates into a unitary organization of branches sparked controversy.29 Mayekiso, a 
veteran of the AAC, reflected the general dislike amongst progressive civics towards the 
organization: 
 
“Instead of properly analysing the role of the civic movement within a shifting political paradigm 
and consulting with its internal organs for a fresh mandate, SANCO responded to these 
challenges by bureaucratising the civic movement … The bottom-up democracy of the civic 
movement was replaced by a top-down instrumentalist approach, which disempowered local 
civics.”30
 
Initially SANCO had been set up with the PAC and Azanian People’s Organisation (APO). 31 By 
late 1993, however, SANCO had formalised its relationship with the ANC by endorsing its 1994 
electoral campaign on grounds that the ANC include SANCO positions on township and rural 
policies in the RDP programme, a deal agreed to by ANC President Mandela and SANCO 
President Moses Mayekiso.32
 
                                                 
27 Quoted in Seekings, J. (2000), op. cit. p. 260 
28 Murray, M. (1994), p. 173 
29 Murray, M. (1994), p. 174 
30 Mayekiso, M. (2003), op. cit. p. 66  
31 Bond, P. (2004), op. cit. p. 19  
32 Not to be confused with his brother Mwazanele Mayekiso. 
 51
 52
Arguably the seeds for the co-option of elements of civil society had been sown in the structuring 
of the UDF in the 1980s and the nature of “dualism” within revolutionary discourse of the 
struggle. However, SANCO bore little resemblance to the dynamic organisations of the 1980s. 
Consequently civics in many parts of the country, choose not to participate with the 
organization.33 By 1996 the SANCO NEC allowed government officials to participate as leaders 
in the civic movement and “SANCO became more of a business organisation in its style of 
operation than a civic movement accountable to a constituency.”34
 
Increasingly civil society had little room to manoeuvre outside of the hegemonic development 
paradigm that took shape in the ANC. Such pressure led some civics to disperse, die a slow death 
within SANCO, or re-emerge in a series of corporatist agreements alongside official local 
government boards.35
 
Yet how much was this demobilization a result of a contrived effort on the behalf of the ANC and 
the new state deliberately co-opting civil society into a development paradigm? How much was 
there a concerted effort to bring in civic groups to adjust to particular visions of development 
which have had minimal impact in transforming South Africa? How much was slowly becoming 
conceivable, to paraphrase Mandela, that had once seemed inconceivable? Behind the criticisms 
of corporatism and selling-out, were there not genuine visions within the government for a 
vibrant and autonomous civil society, a more benevolent vision of the dualist theory? 
   
John Saul has highlighted the, “ANC leadership’s tacit support for the demobilization of those 
popular energies that had been so crucial to the weakening of the apartheid state in the first 
place.”36 McKinley states the strategic failure “to prioritise the will and leading role of the base 
constituency within the liberation movement”, and that the ANC, “guided by its leading 
members, has been unwilling to trust the very people it claims to represent; it has, in effect, been 
unable to trust real democracy.”37 Both analyses play upon a particular machination on behalf if 
the ANC in demobilizing civil society. But just as much as strategic decisions were important, we 
suggest the series of events catalysed by negotiations created and re-created the very terrain in 
                                                 
33 Murray, M. (1994), op. cit. p. 174 
34 Mayekiso, M. (2003), op. cit. p. 68 
35 Murray, M. (1994), op. cit.  p. 174 
36 Saul, J. (1993), op. cit. p. 6 
37 McKinley, D. (1997), op. cit. p. 134  
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which both civil society, the Alliance and the NP were contesting, and in which ultimately the 
power of grassroots movements dissipated.  
 
Expectations were high in the early 1990s. A variety of redistribution and social justice goals in 
the RDP characterized a project of transformation that sought to unite groups. Almost like an 
extension of the Freedom Charter, the RDP had broad aims connected to redressing the injustices 
of apartheid. The discourse forged a mandate that stated: “Above all, we must pursue policies that 
enhance national self-sufficiency and enable us to reduce dependence on international financial 
institutions.”38 Civil society became a buzzword validating diverse experiences, local initiatives, 
and new organizational forms that had been previously subsumed under the “highly centralized, 
etatist visions of emancipation from apartheid which characterized the dominant communist and 
African nationalist currents of opposition.”39 The project for change appeared on the surface to 
empower and rely upon a strong and vibrant civil society to turn social justice into reality. Yet, it 
required civil society to work with the state and government agencies as a junior partner, and to 
make numerous concessions on the goals of its constituents. Let us trace how such a scenario had 
come about. 
 
Civics which relied on their ability to resort to mass action to strengthen their hand at the local-
level negotiation tables found the spaces for autonomy and action increasingly confined during 
the CODESA years. Coovadia notes how:  
 
“The South African government is doing its upmost to separate the ANC and national 
negotiations from mass action which it characterizes as ‘violent’ and contrary to the spirit of 
constitutional negotiations.”40
 
A paralysis gripped those movements whose rhetoric fell on the fringes of developmental 
discourse within the Alliance, but could sill locate their interests in the framework of possibilities 
in the milieu of negotiations. Multilateral dialogue and political compromises forged a growing 
pragmatic realism within the trade union and civics. Radical ideas, the politics of confrontation 
and of “building socialism now” were on hold. The Nationalists had set upon a course of events 
                                                 
38 ANC, The RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994), Johannesburg: Umanyano, section 
6.5 
39 Fine, R. (1992), op. cit. p. 178  
40 Coovadia, C. (1991), op. cit. p. 347  
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that had closed some of the radical spaces, reflecting the resilience of the capitalist economic 
order and their own military-political might. 
 
Within such a context, alternatives failed to crystallize. In 1990 attempts were made to bring 
together a Patriotic Front from Socialist, AZAPO and BC activists. However, this “faltered before 
it got off the ground, amid charges of ‘bad faith’ and backroom dealings.”41 Nothing better 
symbolizes the demobilization that characterized this period than AZAPO’s absence from the 
1994 election, with their re-emergence in the 1999 elections on a far weaker and dilapidated base. 
BC movements were thought to account for at least a quarter of township citizens prior to the first 
election.42 AZAPO had initially mobilized for a boycott of the elections, maintaining a principled 
opposition to the parliamentary democracy.43 Concurrently, little emerged within the movement 
around notions of working class power to transgress ideas around liberal democracy. 
Fundamentally, AZAPO offered no alternative in a period in which radical political spaces 
collapsed while enthusiasm for the elections grew.     
 
Movements seemed to lose their voices unless they attached to the same strategic terrain and 
discourse of unity and transformation as courted by the Alliance. In July 1993 at the NUMSA 
conference a call was made for a mass workers party amid concerns that elite bargaining at the 
World Trade Centre would sell out the struggle. Yet it proved to belie hollow rhetoric as the 
currents of the national democratic revolution prevailed.  
 
The corporate activities of the civil society groups, some of whom had been vehemently anti-
capitalist, mirrored what was going on at a national level. We need not debate an exhaustive list 
of the various moments when the ANC seemed to nurture or coerce such a process. It is perhaps, 
all too easy to suggest the Alliance demobilized and usurped the grassroots without accounting 
for the decisions taken by local leaders and the processes undertaken by the organizations 
themselves. Placing the entire agency on the ANC, and none on the grassroots movements and 
their constituents, is to perhaps overplay the significance of Stalinist traits within the ANC. While 
such elements do exist, we cannot apportion to them so much influence without consigning 
elements of civil society to passive players in the demobilzation process. 
                                                 
41 Murray, M. (1994), op. cit.  p. 13  
42 Personnel Communication, Salim Vally (2004), November 25th 
43 Cherry, J. (2000), Kwazekeke - The Politics of Transition in South Africa: An Eastern Cape Case Study, 
PhD Dissertation at Rhodes University, Chapter 6 
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An analysis of markets and neo-liberalism will help bring out how much evidence there is for 
agency in the Alliance shaping post-Apartheid society. Moreover, an understanding of the 
structure behind such events can give light to what, and if, alternatives were available then and 
how new social movements might seek to elaborate upon them now.  
 
Neo-liberalism in the Transition and Beyond 
 
“The neo-liberal project conceals its own massive use of state power, transnational and local, for 
the purpose for constructing a civil society according to its own image.”44
- Bjorn Beckman (1993) 
  
On the period of 1980s insurrection Mayekiso has written: 
 
“This period of Intifada was the most sophisticated ever in either the national liberation struggle 
or any urban social movement in South African history, and the regime, not only locally but also 
nationally, was near collapse.”45  
 
He echoed the sentiments of Sweezy and Magdoff who had noted in 1986 that South Africa was:  
 
“The only country with a well-developed, modern capitalist structure which is not only 
‘objectively’ ripe for revolution but has actually entered a stage of overt and seemingly 
irreversible revolutionary struggle.”46
 
Despite all of the novel forms of organization that had emerged in resistance and struggles which 
had anti-capitalist conceptions around access to land and services, the potential for 
institutionalizing socialist aims and goals existed not on some irreversible trajectory of history but 
within the context of a hegemonic contestation with a variety of dominant structures and interests. 
                                                 
44 Beckman, B. (1993), “The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal Ideology and Political Theory”, in 
ROAPE, No. 58, p. 30 
45 Mayekiso, M. (1993), op. cit. p. 25 
46 Quoted in Saul, J. (2002), Cry for the Beloved Country: The Post-Apartheid Denouement, Paper 
Presented at Development Studies Seminar, RAU, 30th August, Johannesburg, p. 89 
 55
 56
In reality the ANC and other liberation movements never came close to ensuring these could be 
institutionalised in a military victory.47  
 
We seek to tease out such a contestation within the parameters of what Beckman has outlined as 
the “neo-liberal project”. In 1992 the ANC noted:  
 
“Once again, working class movements in government had, in fact, proved unable to sustain 
social transformation through state intervention, therefore throwing into doubt the capacity of the 
state to fundamentally alter property relations through state mediated social ownership of the 
means of production in the context of advanced capitalism.”48  
 
Hein Marais documented the ANC’s own experience within this experience as the party became 
“assimilated into a web of institutional relations, systems and practices tailored to service the 
interests of [in the first instance] white privilege and [in the final instance] the capitalist class.”49
 
But where had these forces come from? What was neo-liberalism or advanced capitalism, or 
globalization as it has been referred to? Veriava and McKinley have suggest it is “not the neutral 
presensing of a new spirit of global cooperation, but the extension and intensification of the rule 
of the market over all spheres of life”50 We have outlined the homogenizing features this takes on 
the social in Part 1. This intensification of the rule of the market – biopower – has been seen in 
the context of crises within capitalism that began in the 1960s. These were shaped through worker 
struggles (most emphatically France 1968), declining profits, and overproduction. The need to 
search for more markets and areas for investment involved the active participation of the state in 
removing obstacles to the rule of the market over all aspects of production processes. This should 
not be mistaken for the creation of free markets in any sense of the semantics we tend to relate to 
the term “free”. The asymmetrical nature of capitalism in global markets, and the role of the state 
as a facilitator of this, has been shown within various work.51 Neo-liberalism is a political 
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discourse which impels rather than reduces state action. Such a process tends to be conceptualised 
as one of accumulation through crisis. 
 
The term primitive accumulation was used by Marx to account for the separation and 
dispossession of people in relation to the social means of production and reproduction. This 
created a section of the population with no means of survival but their labour power. Foucault has 
described the force and coercion implicit in such a process for the industrial working class. It was 
not a passive and smooth process but one wracked by social destruction and conditioning.52  
 
While we recognise there is nothing implicit about a trajectory of the dialectic between capitalism 
and labour power (and with all the multiplicity of relations across the social), working class 
struggles shaped the conditions in which capital existed after World War II. Declining profits, 
inflation and overproduction in certain areas led to the creation and reproduction of capitalism in 
new spheres and spaces. Such a narrative can be encapsulated in a straightforward manner: 
 
Call centre workers in the north east of England have emerged as one of the main forms of wage 
labour in the 1990s, filling the void left by steel and energy industries. These industries were 
downsized or closed from the early 1980s as cheaper products could be sourced from overseas. 
Strikes and resistance from these communities characterized the period but proved to be 
unsuccessful. With plenty of new service and financial activity focused around immaterial 
production and communications, and given the available labour, the call centre became a major 
phenomenon in this part of the country. Despite dissatisfaction around the monotony and mind-
numbing nature of the job, workers take home pay which is within the countries minimum wage, 
and conditions at work are regulated by a series of labour laws (from work breaks, fire exits, visor 
screens for computer monitors and so on). That such regulations are enshrined in law comes as a 
result of previous disputes and victories throughout union and worker history. For communities 
who have experienced long periods of unemployment, such work is considered to have provided 
some stability and improved living standards and investment in the area (consider in terms of 
there being any implicit antagonism between wage labour and capital that makes socialism a 
given outcome). However over the last few years, companies such as Lloyds TSB have relocated 
from these call centres and set up operations in India. Workers in this part of England have once 
again turned to the ever-diminishing capacity of the welfare state for their survival. The 
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technology, pool of labour which speaks English, and the cheaper operating costs in a country 
without the same standards of living and labour laws, provides the logic for move. Workers in 
India are happy at the opportunity for employment. Many of them are the first generation children 
of rural migrants to cities like New Delhi and Calcutta, and whose families live (and still live) in 
abject poverty. One of the many major investments which the Bank has made is in a chemicals 
company involved in the privatization of agricultural land that had once been considered part of a 
commons-based system. At one point the ancestors of the call centre workers in New Delhi relied 
on the diversity and bounty of these commons which diminish with every inroad that neo-liberal 
capitalism makes. 
 
The narrative is, albeit simplistic and romantic, perhaps indicative of the neo-liberal economic 
accumulation process. It encapsulates the term neo-colonialism as the activities and resources of 
previous colonies become the source of benefit to markets which operate under asymmetrical 
international capitalism. Whether it is clothing companies from South Korea relocating to the 
cheaper Vietnamese and Cambodian markets, or the buying up of entire reservoirs of water in 
India, the process technocrats label “economic realism”, has seen capital take a free rein to 
subsume and totalise the remaining commons, bio-world and global ecology. Social costs and 
exhaustion of resources are ignored in short-term considerations and normative assumptions of 
“profit” and “efficiency”. Attempts to fix this in management strategies, essentially finding 
modernist controls and regulations to make capitalism fairer/greener, by IFIs and governments 
have reinforced top-down hierarchies and Northern-Southern identities of producer and 
consumer, of colonialist and colonized.53
 
We should note that accumulation is not the only term to have been used to describe systemic 
trends. Giovanni Arrighi sees: “the financialization of capital, rather than persistent ‘over-
capacity and over-production’ in manufacturing, as the predominant capitalist response to the 
joint crisis of profitability and hegemony.”54 Downplaying the ‘race to the bottom’ theory, 
Arrighi weaves together the immaterial aspect of production and investment. Without dismissing 
the important differences in strands of interpretation, what remains crucial to our study is the 
strength of these forces – whether in terms of accumulation or financialization capacity – within 
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neo-colonial (neo-empire) systemic trends which the ANC have come to grapple with since 
gaining power.55
 
The notion that the ANC, within the web of such a system, did not have a full deck of playing 
cards available to it in 1994, is a view which holds much sway. That capital was one of the 
elements responsible for bringing the ANC in from the cold has been shown across the 
historiography. 56 The apartheid state was forced to implement economic, political and social 
policy changes in response to structural crises experienced by capitalism (with its specific 
manifestations under apartheid such as international boycotts) as well as to growing resistance 
from black workers and communities (unions and/or the civics) internally. Policies with a neo-
liberal nature began to shape South Africa from the early 1980s.57 This was sealed by the regime 
at the end of the 1980s as important sections of big business began implementing elements of a 
neo-liberal accumulation strategy.58 It is a mistake to see neo-liberal politics suddenly being 
“implemented” with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policies of 1996 but as 
a stream which ran from Apartheid South Africa into the new one. 
 
In 1993, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), of which the ANC played a leading role, 
signed an IMF loan for $750 million. It was a reflection of the pressure from the developmental 
“experts” from IFIs who sought to make sure the continuity of neo-liberal economics prevailed. 
Given with the milieu in which the SACP tearfully saw its comrades in Eastern Europe disappear, 
and without any other imagination of socialism from the left of the party, options were limited.59 
Lewis noted:  
 
“Capital does not appear to have articulated a new and imaginative economic policy for South 
Africa. On the contrary, to the extent that one is able to glean an economic direction from capital 
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it comprises a conservative melange of cuts in government expenditure; privatisation; reductions 
in corporate and high income taxation rates; and deregulation.”60
 
Habib suggests however, “corporatism has emerged simultaneously with the ascendancy of the 
neo-liberal macro-economic strategy”. Yet it wasn’t so much the ascendancy of neo-liberalism 
than the emergence of new symbols. Neo-liberalism needed new vehicles if it was going to ride 
the wave of radical ideas around socialist transformation which held considerable hegemony. 
This took the form, as Habib noted, in the institutionalizing “corporatist arrangements, including 
NEDLAC.”61
 
Thus the features of 1980s policies, which slowly sought to shake off “racial exclusion” from the 
role of markets, became a process pursued with considerable vigour in the 1990s. Yet, in a 
society characterised by the dynamics of racial inequality and exploitation, are we right to 
emphasise an economic, class based analysis? Is there not a danger when deploying phrases such 
as ‘from apartheid to neo-liberalism’ of undermining the structural racial inequalities that were so 
embedded within apartheid, and which given the nature of reform and transformation, continue to 
shape, reinforce and re-create South African society.  
 
Race and Class 
 
“We must work to ensure that there emerges a black bourgeoisie, whose presence within our 
economy and society will be part of the process of the deracialisation of the economy and 
society.” 62  
- Thabo Mbeki, 1999 
 
The logic of neo-liberal policies for growth and development rarely require complex 
deconstruction. Bethlehem provides a typical approach grounded in the economic realism of good 
governance theory: 
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“In short and to repeat, South Africa’s growth would be from a low base and therefore, would 
offer possibilities of aggregate expansion which countries with mature or saturated markets could 
not match. All South Africa needs to do … is to get its political house in order now.”63
 
Bringing out the real semantics behind such a statement requires little imagination: 
 
South Africa has a lot of poor people (black). They form a massive pool of cheap labour (base) 
which investors can profit from. Capitalists from countries which have higher living standards 
and over-accumulation, find South Africa ripe for investment in areas which capital has yet to 
take root (e.g. water, electricity). All South Africa needs to do is to make sure trade unions such 
as COSATU don’t get restless and bring instability to the country. Co-option will be useful. 
Those who resist co-option can be branded ultra-leftists, reactionaries, racists or apartheid era 
spies. If it starts to get out of hand some orthodox state repression should do the trick. 
 
Social commentary in South Africa tries to downplay the continuing structure of racism that 
permeates the country to the core. Typical arguments include: “But the shopping mall is full of 
black people”, “I saw poor whites begging for food” or “Affirmative Action (AA) and Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) are working.” That poverty is somehow deracialized forms the 
most serious and disturbing myth in post-Apartheid society. While it is correct to note that being 
rich is no longer the preserve of whites only, and that some white communities have suffered 
increasing levels of poverty, the millions of people who are landless in South Africa (increasing 
in number after ten years of democracy), have a common denominator in that they are black. 
 
To continue the analysis purely in terms of economics and class, eclipses the racism so embedded 
within structures that continue to perpetuate land ownership policies which can be judged in no 
other guise than a vivid continuation of racist relations, demographics and geography. The need 
for a strong undercurrent to BC thought is needed more than ever if the exploitative economic 
structures which are deeply entwined within racist realities are to be transformed. 
 
The ‘retreat’ from egalitarianism, social justice and anti-capitalist practices emerged as the 
outcome of a war of position which the left lost and rarely articulated at least within the Alliance. 
The left included, not just the elitist ANC leadership and vanguards, but some of the civil society 
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and social movement groups who struggled to find identities in the interregnum and immediate 
post-Apartheid milieu. Such a viewpoint is substantially more plausible than “Great Betrayal” 
narratives because it examines policies and actions as the outcome of contest amongst various 
forces. To suggest otherwise robs some of the grassroots organisations of any agency whatsoever 
and negates the leadership within such organizations who make real decisions. As Lodge noted: 
“Any efforts to genuinely confront South Africa’s glaring class and racial divisions requires 
uprooting and immobilizing entrenched power centres.”64 Here, behind the rhetoric of national 
democratic revolution, there remained continuity rather than discontinuity in the journey of neo-
liberalism in apartheid to post-apartheid.  
 
Any analysis, which recognises this role of agency within some confines of the structure, requires 
finding a delicate balance between the two in establishing a historicity. As Mafeje notes on 
liberation movements generally: 
 
“Many of the heroes of the independence movement in Africa turned the same, joined the 
imperialist exploiters, and made pariahs of their own people. Was it simply an act of betrayal and 
capriciousness on the part of those concerned; or was it a result of certain objective factors.”65
 
This captures the dialectical relationship between the subject and structure which cannot be 
simply bifurcated in an analysis. However, as we move on to consider the role of new social 
movements post-Apartheid, the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela, which also took place in the 
mid-1990s, throws up interesting questions as to other policy routes available to the ANC and its 
civil society allies. Where the confines in terms of Empire and capitalism have persisted in 
Venezuela since Chavez came to power, there has also emerged considerable space for civil 
society and local, grassroots autonomous movements to gain access to power and resources for 
the first time.66 The state remains openly conscious of the contradiction pursuing policies on the 
one hand which enable access to markets, while attempting to nurture and empower civil society 
to weaken that very relationship. It is a journey into unknown territory and in which social 
movements will need to fight the pressures of co-option and the lure of adopting an NGO style 
presence and organization. Whether the ANC is capable of dismantling some of the institutions 
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and tools of exploitation together with its own class interests is unlikely. Whether, the people can 
facilitate such a change is another matter.  For South Africa to pursue a similar path to Venezuela 
requires the visions and development of anti-systemic alternatives of a project that will come to 
de-link from the ANC and grand etatist narratives of the past, placing comrades on a trajectory 
that is influenced by, but broken with, the past.  
 
 63
 64
PART 4 
                                                     
 
 
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: REVOLUTIONARY SUBJECTS AND DISRUPTURE IN 
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
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Commodification in “Ten Years of Confusion and Poverty” 
 
“They don’t want South Africa to be free. In Harrismith it is just a song to say that South Africa 
is free. We are not free. This ten years of democracy has not been ten years of democracy to us, it 
has been ten years of confusion and poverty, more poverty.” 
- Nehu Mdowu, Chair of Harrismith Concerned Residents (HRC) and ANC member, 2004  
 
Presentation of ANC policy since May 1994 has centred upon goals which have a broadly social-
justice and transformative outlook. Rhetoric behind it does not take a fixed form and has 
fluctuated around nationalist, populist, black empowerment and socialist positions. McDonald 
and Pape have suggested that from GEAR onwards: 
 
“While policies and laws often maintained some populist rhetoric, the underlying economic and 
political principles were informed by neo-liberal principles of globalisation: fiscal restraint; 
export orientation; privatisation and corporatization; financial and trade liberalization, and cost 
recovery.”1
 
The notion that the ANC “talks left, walks right” succinctly captures this process.2 It is a term 
which has taken on much resonance with the social-democratic administrations across Europe 
since the early 1990s. However, another strain of thought has emerged (particularly within the 
SACP) which perceive various discursive juxtaposing within the Alliance as a reflection of 
genuine hegemonic struggles within the ANC. This is used as justification for unity in the 
Alliance and that pursuing the interests of the poor and working class within this framework can, 
and will, ultimately lead to socialism.3 Indeed, we will see how such a position is used to cajole 
social movements into co-option, as opposed to increasing confrontation with the state. 
 
It was clear from the macro-economic strategies formed by Congress working groups in the early 
nineties, and crystallized in the visions put through in the RDP, that the ANC could not articulate 
a coherent challenge to the growth path of neo-liberalism.4 However, retaining a revolutionary 
identity, whether seeped in nationalism or socialism, and ensuring it was digestible to various 
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social groups was vital for electoral and constituent purposes. Moreover, it provides the cement to 
bind what we can call the “left” to the party. Yet beneath the rhetoric, the full impact of neo-
liberal macroeconomics was to shape the experiences of millions of poor and landless South 
Africans. While the government spoke the language of People’s Power – a term stretched beyond 
all possible imagination in some discourse – the high expectations from the struggle around 
rights, services and land failed to materialize. 
 
Neo-liberalism and commodification, as we argued in Part 1, have a multiplicity of relations 
between subjects and the social. What we recognized as an increasingly totalized social throws up 
possibilities for change, moments of resistance and new struggles, just as much as it can fuse the 
logic of capitalism into life. A brief overview of policy from 1994 will provide us with the 
backdrop necessary to view anti-capitalist alternatives that have re-emerged in NSM politics. 
 
Boycotts over rent and services infused the struggle against apartheid in two ways. Firstly, there 
developed a deeply engrained notion of common rights denied by the system. Secondly, 
withholding payment was used as a means to attack the legitimacy the regime. From this we can 
conclude that people saw an intrinsic human right to common goods, necessary for the 
reproduction of life such as water, shelter, and power. 
 
Any payment for the spheres of life (such as housing or municipal services) was thus only 
acceptable within a justice-based paradigm. 
 
Such a paradigm featured slogans such as “one city one tax base”, and was rooted in an 
understanding that the wealth of white individuals and businesses would be used to subsidise 
deprived black areas. Central to this were ideas around the formation of non-racial communities 
and replacing racial separateness with economic and social inclusiveness. Payment for the 
privilege of living in one of apartheid’s dumping grounds, or for the up-keep of the BLA system, 
had been continually contested with the state. The decision faced by the post-Apartheid state was 
thus, how to institutionalize these alternative visions, or how to revive a culture of payment in the 
vein of individual responsibility, cost recovery and private profit.  
 
Operation Masakhane (‘lets build together’) was implemented from February 1995. Communities 
were actively encouraged to start paying for basic services as ‘responsible citizens’ contributing 
to the ‘good governance’ of ‘our democracy’. While many apartheid arrears for services were 
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cleared, the emphasis was on a clean start for service payment. Resistance was portrayed as the 
persistence of ‘a culture of non-payment’. The language of ungovernability in the fight for free 
basic services for all had dissipated. Operation Masakhane marked the first major step to reinvest 
people in the market and for the new state to maintain the set of relations which had undergone 
such serious contestation during the struggle. It was perhaps not surprising that payment rates for 
municipal services (and rent) declined throughout the 1990s.5 By the end of the decade the state 
responded with millions of cuts-offs and evictions.6  
 
Behind the cut-offs lay the grim ideology of economic realism. Free-market liberalization, 
privatization, restructuring of industrial relations, deregulation and embryonic corporatism were 
not just ad-hoc, momentary responses to international and local pressures, but part of a 
developmental paradigm based upon accumulation and IFI-style structural adjustment. Playing by 
the rules of global capitalism also meant a commitment to repaying (mostly Apartheid era and 
odious) debt. In some years this accounted for just under a quarter of government spending. 7 The 
obvious implications for social spending led activist and writer Ashwin Desai to state, “we have 
reached a situation where paying the debt has much graver implications for South Africa than 
repudiating it.”8
 
Attaining social justice was synonymous with investment and growth. The asymmetrical nature 
of investment and development within a paradigm of market systems has been revealed at length 
elsewhere, revealing how existing conditions of inequality become further entrenched.9 In South 
Africa the simple reality was that the legacies of apartheid were being reproduced: blacks got 
poorer and whites got richer.10
 
While policies at a macro-level followed a broadly typical IFI structural adjustment plan, local 
government came to epitomize the logic of the market and investment, making South Africa an 
archetype for private public partnerships (PPPs). Corporatization within a wide range of services 
and, and in some cases outright privatization, continued the neo-liberal trajectory of cost-recovery 
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with private. We don’t have time to catalogue this process as it has been pursued extensively 
elsewhere.11 However, let us look at the ramifications and the vivid forms it was to have in 
defining people’s lives. 
 
From the pre-paid water metre, which effectively acts as a cut-off until you pay, to private 
security companies evicting (and in several cases killing) rent defaulters who live in some of the 
most underprivileged communities. From the bulldozing of shacks deemed undesirable, and the 
removal of township and squatter camp dwellers into new dumping grounds such as Bram Fischer 
outside Johannesburg; the brutal and devastating impact of neo-liberal economics for South 
Africa’s growing poor took on an increasingly common narrative. The numbers of unemployed 
have climbed to record levels, almost doubling between 1995 and 2002.12
 
Meth’s study of poverty from 1998-2002 found disturbing evidence that contradicted government 
claims that social-economic transformation of South Africa was well underway. It noted: “With 
the possible exception of water and electricity, the social wage barely addresses income 
poverty.”13 Moreover, the government’s claims to have made massive progress in tackling 
poverty and neglect were said to “look a little weak in the face of this massive rise in human 
misery”.14 In 2001 the government brought in minimum free household lifelines of 6000 litres of 
water and 50kwh of electricity per month, as a result of widespread condemnation and resistance 
to the corporatization of the service industries. Yet it was only a Pyrrhic victory in that the 
lifeline volumes were woefully inadequate; they enhanced the individual rather than collective 
responsibility; and in a variety of cases were not applicable anyway.15
 
Yet, the impulse of South African policy is best captured within an ideological framework, not 
within the manifestations of GEAR, but in the encompassing notions of African growth and 
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Renaissance as defined within the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Given 
the prominence of South Africa in drafting and promoting the document, it encapsulates the 
“modern” and utopian visions held within the ANC leadership not just for South Africa, but also 
for the entire continent. 
 
NEPAD notes that it “differs in its approach and strategy from all previous plans and initiatives in 
support of Africa’s development, although the problems to be addressed remain largely the 
same”.16  The problems we can loosely summarize as: endemic poverty; corruption; top-down 
hierarchical relations of power, nepotism and subordination; gender violence and oppression; 
artificial urban/rural divides and the re-colonisation of economic structures for the benefit of 
dominant classes (internal and external).  
 
In response, NEPAD makes several overtones towards internalised and self-sufficient modes of 
development. The challenge is posed as one: 
 
 “For the peoples and governments of Africa to understand that development is a process of 
empowerment and self-reliance. Accordingly, Africans must not be wards of benevolent 
guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment.”17  
 
There is the need for a “discretionary preferential trade system for intra-African trade” and role 
for domestic resources “to be substantially increased (with) more effective tax collection … to 
increase public resources, as well as the rationalising of government expenditures.18 In terms of 
the trajectory on development, NEPAD shares some of the domestic and internal concerns of the 
Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980, but adds the components of good governance and global 
market orientated economics into a melting pot of discourse that seems to be responding to a 
variety of needs.  
 
The following characteristic statement of the programme reveals this: “Democratic regimes that 
are committed to the protection of human rights, people-centred development and market-
orientated economies are on the increase”.19 These three notions are enmeshed within the 
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paradigm of development, and the ascendancy of the latter component throughout the document 
swamps any narrative over preferential internal trade systems or self-sufficiency. It is not 
necessary to highlight every example but to gain a sense of the dominance of an Africanised neo-
liberal philosophy that seeks to engage in the continued export-orientated policies still propagated 
by the IFIs.20  It is in order to compete and link-up within this system NEPAD suggests: 
 
“These economic conditions point to the need for African countries to pool their resources and 
enhance their regional development and economic integration on the continent, in order to 
improve international competitiveness”21
 
Criticism that it is Africa’s continual exploitation within this system, forms questions as to why 
such procedures (solidarity and pooling resources), cannot be put into place for meeting the social 
and environmental needs of people. Moreover we are told that: 
 
“The world has entered the new millennium in the midst of an economic revolution. This 
revolution could provide both the context and the means for Africa’s rejuvenation. While 
globalization has increased the cost of Africa’s ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of 
an effectively managed integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and 
poverty reduction.”22
 
This economic revolution – the traits of which we have seen through new forms of empire and 
colonialism – is expected to bring about prosperity if Africa can only just integrate more into the 
system. This takes a benevolent perception of capital, failing to perceive the massive investments 
into countries like Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where capital is 
attracted by cheap, fast profits and not any social concerns over development. Consequently 
NEPAD reflects the dominant philosophy within the ANC that meeting social justice comes 
second, and as a trickle-down effect, of meeting the requirements of international capital and the 
Washington consensus. That “responsible capital” can exist harmoniously with meeting social 
and economic needs is a central part and myth of such project. Although there are a variety of 
discursive moments in the document, which conjure populist and self-sufficient visions, the core 
reference point of the policies reflect top-down, export-orientated structural adjustment. 
                                                 
20 World Bank, (2002) Building a Sustainable Future: The Africa Region Environment Strategy, 
Washington, DC 
21 NEPAD, op. cit. paragraph 94 
22 ibid. paragraph 28 
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That this developmental paradigm has emerged in South Africa with considerable hegemony has 
partly emerged due to the lack of clearly articulated alternatives, and any serious political 
opposition. Shubane noted in 1991 that: “An influx of such personnel into other social institutions 
might be so large that in effect it will lead to the demise of civic organizations.”23 This prediction 
correctly perceived the process in which various figures active in civil society took up positions 
within the administration. The grassroots organizations left behind faced an identity crisis in the 
new drive for Unity post-1994, as confrontation was replaced with co-operation. This evolved to 
often marginalize local structures rather than empowering them. With Local Labour Forums 
(LLFs) mandated by the Systems Act (2000) to participate in Integrated Development Plans 
(IDPs), such structures tend to be stripped of any real power and act as the facilitator of policies 
and directives made from central government.24 This is reinforced by the experiences of many 
activists within SANCO or with local Ward Committees that such institutions prove to be little 
more than rubber-stamping facilitators of central government directives.25
 
However, South African politics in an era of continuing neo-liberalism and commodification has 
not yet forged hegemonic identities outside of the ANC. Those that exist do so in an embryonic 
form. Indeed for many of the poorest and most vulnerable South Africans, the Alliance is seen to 
protect the rights of the people, a continuation perhaps of what Freidman identified as the culture 
of reliance on leadership politics.26 However, the frailty within the Alliance is beginning to 
emerge and unravel as civil society and grassroots movements regain some of the autonomy that 
dissipated throughout the 1990s. The principles of neo-liberalism transgressed the imaginations of 
the struggle. They took guise in the shape of a development paradigm that would be unimaginable 
in the 1980s, “inconceivable” in February 1990, and smacked of hypocrisy, injustice and cruelty 
to millions in 2005.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Shubane, K. (1991), op. cit. p. 74 
24 McDonald, D. & Pape, J. (2002), op. cit. p. 187 
25 Personnel Communication, Sam Hargreaves, LPM – Gauteng, May 2004 and see the experience of 
campaigners in the Western Cape in Veriava, A. & McKinley. D. (2005), op. cit.  
26 The general formed from all the residents I spoke to in Harrismith and Khayelitsha conveyed this. The 
ANC’s strong electoral support base in poor areas also backs up this notion. In addition see Sachs, M. 
(2004) The Poor Believe in the Poll, Mail and Guardian, May 23rd. 
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The Resurgence of Rights: Politics of decommodification and anti-capitalism 
 
“My name is Pauline Tsotetsi ... I was the mother of Teboho as his parents had passed away. The 
first one is Oupa Mkhosa, the second one is Teboho and the third one Nsaki. They came here 
because their parents had passed away and their grandmother had passed away. There was no one 
who could take care of them. They started school here and Tebobo was doing standard 8 until he 
was shot. The day Teboho went out of this house it was on the 31st. He was going to school in the 
morning and then when they got to school they [the Harrismith Concerned Residents – HCR] said 
they must go out from the school. They were going for strike. They went to the N3; this is the 
place where there was the accident. And then we went to the hospital because he was bleeding, he 
didn’t stop bleeding. This was the place where Teboho passed away in the hospital […]  
The thing that makes us sad is the children like Teboho did not throw stones at anybody. They 
were just singing. They don’t do anything wrong. The police just shoot them. I blame the police. 
If there is a strike everyone is given warning. They must say five minutes you must be out if this 
place. But they didn’t do this. They just shoot. That is why Teboho died.” 
- Pauline Tsotestsi, Harrismith, November 2004  
 
The issues which surround the shooting of Teboho Mkhosa by police, symbolizes a common 
narrative for millions of poor people in South Africa. Teboho’s “accident” brought the full glare 
of a media circus to Harrismith. The stereotype of the violent and lawless township was beamed 
across the nation. It seemed even ANC Premier Beatrice Marshoff was in danger of being 
shunned, and at worst attacked, by the seething mobs of township agitators. Yet the underlying 
tensions which catalysed the series of eruptions across the Free State during the winter of 2004 – 
and which have continued into 2005 – appear to have finally spurred a debate around service 
delivery ten years into South Africa’s freedom. Moreover, it is not so much “formalized” social 
movements such as the APF or the LPM at the forefront of this discontent, but disparate 
“community crisis” groups, the recreation of 1980s civics, such as the HCR which are breaking 
out in new moments of defiance, organization and mobilization across the country. While we note 
the formal social movements cited above were born out of these types of “crisis” formations, 
there are important distinctions between the groups. Community crisis groups tend to have a 
strong identity and affiliation to the ANC at the grassroots level. This poses interesting questions 
as to how disparate movements might come together, operate at a local level and ultimately 
contest power. Their integration with more formalized social movements could play a role in 
determining this process. 
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Pauline agreed that community anger was concerned with the lack of service delivery across the 
municipality, noting the ANC “did promise that they are going to bring us things, but they do not 
do those things, that’s why they end up going to strike.” There was a strong sense of continuity 
from old struggles into new: 
 
“Did you remember in 1994 we were still looking for freedom, even now it seems like freedom is 
not there because they promised us things but they are not there, that is why we see the people are 
busy toyi-toying. They promise us things but they are not won.” 
 
The general feeling of dismay, of not having “won” the fruits which lay behind the symbols of 
freedom, became unravelled in the demands of a new civic: the HCR. Their memorandum to the 
local authorities highlighted a series of demands rooted in the discourse of People’s Power of the 
1980s. From access to land, an end to nepotism and corruption, for the delivery of adequate 
housing for all, the document was constructed upon a set of community rights, consciousness and 
existence.27 Pauline concurred with the idea that dissatisfaction across for country from the slums 
in Durban to the townships that sprawl across Gauteng were fighting for the same rights: 
 
“Yes it’s the same thing that we are fighting for. The services are poor, the services they don’t do 
them, instead of opening work they just close them.” 
 
Meanwhile the “lifeline” held up by the ANC as the evidence that there are free basic services for 
all had not been implemented in Harrismith. Electricity had been introduced to Harrismith during 
apartheid and had been the subject of fierce payment boycotts during the 1980s. It appeared that 
in 2004 those people in the community who worked did not receive the lifeline and had to 
contribute towards the payment for power as well as for water. Harrismith residents noted that 
even though they worked, wages were so low, and with school fees to pay, they could not afford 
extra costs for electricity. Cut-offs ensued and sparked some of the anger and discontent that has 
contributed to various township uprisings in the Free State since Winter 2004. Nuhu Mdowu 
noted that: 
 
“The problem of the electricity is meaning that some of the people are just making, I mean, 
stealing the electricity. If you come to my house you can find that I am stealing electricity, maybe 
                                                 
27 HRC Memorandum, (2004) op. cit.  
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you can find that problem is that these people are corrupt, it is the councillors who are causing 
these things.” 
 
On the issue of elections Teboho’s relatives reflected a disdain towards the electoral process. 
Pauline stated: 
 
“On my side I can’t say I am going to vote, because I am going to vote for someone who is not 
going to do anything because the one that we vote for does not do anything ... even in the local 
municipality it is a waste of time.” 
 
Nuhu Mdowu gave the historical background to the HCR: 
 
“We have started the concerned residents from the 27th of May and the aim is simply because the 
lives of the people have been taken away by the people who are calling themselves the leadership 
[ANC] while they are violating the rights of the people. Most of the members of the concerned 
group are from ANC. But we have felt that most of the other people are not represented. If you 
are not a member of ANC, or SANCO you will just be admitted. So we call upon the whole 
community seeing the poor service delivery and that the councillors representing us, they are not 
doing.” 
 
The HCR made it clear their affiliations, at least symbolically, were to the ANC believing that if 
President Mbeki was privy to the failures of ANC structures at a local level he would rectify the 
problems. However, it was also clear, and reflected in the membership intake, that the HCR 
identified as the community.28 Meanwhile identities to the ANC were lodged around People’s 
Power, broadly Socialist aims of the Charter and the social justice goals of the RDP. Against 
these visions were nepotism and corrupt agencies within the ANC that were preventing and 
holding back the transformation of the community. 
 
“And when it comes to the RDP houses, favouritism has been practiced by the local municipality 
and the local leaders and we have discovered a lot of corruption. And the issue of nepotism, you 
can go to the municipality, only one surname or two which is ruling our municipality, people are 
                                                 
28 Although Inkarta supporters in the nearby hostels had not joined the group.  
 75
not employed, its just a question of who are you and where do you belong and then you know that 
the gates are closed. That’s the main problem.”29
 
Meanwhile, Mdowu implicated ward committees into the structures of patronage: 
 
“Leaders are using ward committees to see who should be given first preference when it comes to 
jobs especially within the project but there have been no changes, we just see people being 
employed over night by the councillors, going door to door.” 
 
The strongly articulated position of the HCR, highlighting the failure of the ANC to deliver on its 
core promises, had clearly rattled the party at a provincial level. The HCR had evidence revealing 
substantial bribes offered to its leadership in order to buy their silence and co-operation. This has 
been a common experience for activists from a variety of social movements. Given the desperate 
socio-economic conditions under which people survive, such tactics can serve to demobilize 
movements outside of the Alliance. However, it has also worked to harden the resolve of the most 
committed groups. The HCR, incensed by the attempt to pay them off, were resilient in their 
opposition: 
 
“When I disclosed this bribery to the community on Sunday they decided they are just waiting for 
the children to finish their exams. After that Harrismith will be an ungovernable place.”30
 
Confrontation looks set to increase the repression which has already left Teboho dead. Most of 
the HCR leadership have already been targeted by the state at a local level, receiving criminal 
records which prevent them from contesting elections. Given their popularity at the grassroots 
level they would stand a good chance of winning.  
 
The HCR noted some of their demands around electricity had been won despite the fact that local 
councillors had not engaged with the community to inform them. It appeared free services had 
been restored to the township after the uprisings at the end of August and beginning of 
September. However the task team set up by the ANC to look at the residents’ grievances had 
done little to win back the confidence of the HCR: 
 
                                                 
29 Personnel Communication, Nuhu Mdowu (2004), op. cit.  
30 ibid. 
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“We see that this thing [the task team] that was established by the Premier and the minister for 
municipal and local government it was just an attempt to silence us … [they said] the RDP will be 
taken back.  Those were the things which the task team has started about. The task team has been 
established. Nothing has changed. Everything is still operating in the way it was before. The RDP 
was never reviewed until today.”31
 
While some commentators and activists might point to a “lack” in analysis, and perhaps even a 
naiveté within the HCR’s stance that the ANC leadership in Gauteng has their interests at heart, 
the crucial conclusions we can make is in the defiance, commitment and zeal which the 
community are pursuing within particular interpretations of the Charter. That a critical 
examination of neo-liberalism didn’t shape part of the HCR’s grievances should not be seen as a 
weakness, a pervasive feature of a considerable amount of leftist and elitist intellectual analysis. 
What mattered was that the community was fighting for an alternative vision. The Charter was 
also to be reflected in the social justice goals of the RDP and in the People’s Contract pledge 
made by the ANC at the 2004 elections. While we have noted the frailties in Charters or Fronts 
around policies that can be contested from a bourgeois/liberal perspective, they can also serve to 
have highly politicising effects when articulated in alternative visions. What catalysed the various 
uprisings across the Free State in the last year have been clear demands around the broad re-
distributional goals of the Charter which have not yet been implemented. It is in many ways 
similar to the approach taken by the LPM in relation to land.32 Appeals of a legal or moral nature 
may characterize the first step of demands, but these give way to more direct attacks on the 
symbols seen to be perpetuating injustice. The process, from a co-operative to confrontational 
relationship, is perhaps indicative of things to come and will pose serious concerns for the ANC 
unless it can begin to embark on policies which genuinely transform not just the hot-spot of 
Harrismith and the Free State, but South Africa as a whole.  
 
Khayelitsha 
“To a dispassionate architectural correspondent of a local newspaper, it is a ‘bizarre creation of 
yet another vast, remote, racial ghetto, with its flattened dunes and militarily securable borders’. 
To one resident we spoke to, “Khayelitsha is the last grave of Blacks in the Western Cape.”33
- ANC Sechaba, 1986 
                                                 
31 Personnel Communication, (2004), HRC Leadership in Harrismith 
32 Personnel Communication, (June 26th, 2004), Mangaliso Kubheko, LPM National Co-ordinator 
33 Khayletisha – The Wasteland, Sechaba, August 1986, p. 32 
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“Please show this footage to as many people as possible so they can see how we are forced to 
live. No-one should have to live through this.” 
- Site C Squatter Camp Resident, 2005 
 
Today Khayelitsha is home to tens of thousands of tiny metal and cardboard shacks crammed 
together across vast dunes of sand and swamps of stench water and waste. The squatter camps, 
many of them known simply as “Site”, followed by a letter, are cut up by Cape Town’s network 
of highways. Bridges between sites are meshed and enclosed with razor wires. Giant walls 
prevent access to the highways. Squeezed into Khayelitsha’s borders are over 1 million 
inhabitants. Literally meaning “Our new home”, Khayelitsha is South Africa's second largest 
township after Soweto, although it is primarily made up of squatter camps. In the 1980s it was 
one of apartheid’s largest dumping sites for blacks, situated about 30km from Cape Town. Many 
of its residents are migrants from the Eastern Cape, seeking to escape poverty and land 
dispossession by finding work in Cape Town. There they hope to find employment in the 
decaying textile and manufacturing and construction industries, or as housekeepers, gardeners or 
cleaners for Cape Town’s wealthy.  
 
Interspersed amongst the thousands of shacks are houses. Many of them are concrete structures 
built during apartheid and financed by banks through PPP arrangements with Botha’s regime. 
Some RDP subsidized houses have been built but their numbers have thus far been totally 
inadequate for the volume of people in this sprawling township. It is on the fringes of 
Khayelitsha, in Mandela Park, where some of the fiercest struggles against evictions have been 
fought by the local branch of the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC), and as documented by Ashwin 
Desai and Richard Pithouse in the story: ‘But We Were Thousands: Dispossession, Resistance, 
Repossession and Repression in Mandela Park’.34 Their narrative need not be retold here, other 
than establishing the background to the AEC’s struggle and how issues over the right to housing 
interplay with the Khayelitsha community at large.  
 
Banks built houses in Mandela Park at the end of the 1980s. Payment took shape in the form of 
bond payments. As we have already noted, struggles throughout apartheid attacked the legitimacy 
                                                 
34 Desai, A. & Pithouse, R. (2003), But We Were Thousands: Dispossession, Resistance, Repossession and 
Repression in Mandela Park, Durban, Centre for Civil Society Report No. 9. For another thorough analysis 
see Chapters 2 and 3 of Veriava, A. & McKinley. D. (2005), op. cit.  
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of such arrangements and Mandela Park was no exception. The township was the site of intense 
boycotts with residents refusing to pay for the privilege to live in one of apartheid’s dumping 
grounds. Evictions failed to materialize with the regime believing such actions would politicize 
communities further. Similarly, the banks played a waiting game, holding out for a more suitable 
time in which they could reap the profits from their housing ventures. The dreams of non-racial 
polities and of communities themselves being “involved at all levels of decision-making and 
implementation” soon dissipated after 1994.35  
 
Discussions between the banks and ANC led to the creation of SERVCON in 1995 which aimed 
to facilitate payment of bonds to the banks. SANCO became co-opted into this arrangement when 
it became clear that resistance to the payments was continuing on a local level. SANCO structures 
cut a deal with some of the banks and subsequently become part owners in a new joint housing 
venture called Khayelethu Home Loans, which took over many of the housing bonds in Mandela 
Park. Residents who “refused” to pay were presented with three options; re-structuring of the 
payments; relinquishing their house; or being right-sized under an initiative designed to place 
residents in more “suitable” housing. The RDP houses offered were many miles away and 
referred to as “dog kennels” by residents. That the payments to the banks exceeded the original 
cost of the houses several times over, together with the moral implications of paying such odious 
debts from apartheid development, did not lead to any justice based approaches to housing in 
Mandela Park. By 1999 failure to keep up with payments led to wide-scale evictions and new 
forms of resistance.  
 
Working with the newly formed Western Cape AEC, residents launched the Mandela Park AEC 
and began to call mass meetings in the community in order to build an organisation for 
representation. This was independent of existing political parties and the ‘civic’ formations that 
had become part of the establishment.36 The events of the next few years have been chronicled in 
the accounts we have already cited. Essentially various attempts made by the MPAEC, to engage 
the state into conducive dialogue failed leading to increasingly defiant identities and actions. 
Typically these revolved around putting evicted families back into their houses in often violent 
confrontations with private security firms and police. The AEC was the target of enormous 
repression of several years leading to increasing energies being bound up within defensive tasks 
                                                 
35 RDP, (1994), op. cit. sections 22-28 
36 Veriava, A. & McKinley. D. (2005), op. cit. p. 23 
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such as bail, court cases (including prison sentences) and fighting harassment. 37 Nevertheless, the 
movement opened new spaces and possibilities for some of the “rights” that had been so intrinsic 
to earlier struggles.  
 
For a brief period of time a People’s Power school opened. Demands hinged upon a rights base 
discourse reminiscent of the mass meetings of the 1980s, evoking notions of direct democracy 
that sharpened the focus of activists across the world onto Mandela Park.38 The typical demands 
made were: “a) structural problems with houses must be fixed; b) government must buy back land 
from the banks; c) the government housing subsidy must be used to pay for houses and 
outstanding debts.”39
 
Although the AEC has called for housing for residents at large, it never became the core issue in 
its strategy.40 Nevertheless, solidarity with the group extended beyond the immediate community 
and from activists whose housing situation was even more ominous than those who lived under 
the constant threat of eviction. The fundamental issue around housing problems for the majority 
of Khayelitsha residents didn’t revolve around eviction, but in replacing squatter camps and 
shacks, with sustainable and just forms of housing. One resident from Site C stated: 
 
“As a result of that actually many people are criticizing the organisation, they feel that at least it 
shouldn’t have been the way it is, you understand that. And also with the campaign and the 
campaign at large I think also they could have dealt with the question of inadequate housing even 
though they called themselves the AEC.” 
 
Certainly one of the major problems of NSM politics is expecting a moment of insurrection, 
defiance or resistance to transgress into some kind of more “progressive” or “revolutionary” 
moments. Struggle does not unwind in predictable stages, but in the creation and re-creation of 
positions attained through their own agencies and interaction with the site of (and structure of) 
subordination. These are expressed in moments of various intensity, space and time. In 
Khayelitsha the decline in the rate of evictions represented a major victory for residents, but left 
the AEC severely strained. Indeed a quick analysis would suggest that the organisation is a shell 
                                                 
37 'Case of the 5' against Khayelitsha Anti-Eviction Campaign activists withdrawn, 
http://southafrica.indymedia.org/ (22nd Oct, 2004)  
38 The Fourth World War, (2003), New York, Big Noise Films 
39 Desai, A. and Van Heusden, P. (2003), quoted in Veriava, A. & McKinley. D. (2005), op. cit. p. 24 
40 Memorandums frequently include demands such as “decent housing for all now!” 
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of its former self, riddled with allegations of elitist leadership and corruption, and unclear in its 
relationship within the SMI. However, as Veriava and McKinley point out, while the “basic 
conditions of life for many community members remain precarious and hostage to the dictates of 
an unresponsive state/private sector, so too will the struggles of the MPAEC continue to be 
waged.”41  
 
Evictions perhaps only represented the tip of an iceberg of sites of subordination that can be 
traced throughout various communities in Khayelitsha and South Africa. However, the 
emergence of the AEC brought into play a variety of questions around what the goals of such a 
movement should be. Despite the criticism that the movement retained too narrow a focus, it 
proved successful in opening moments and spaces over certain grievances. Moreover it opened up 
discussion within the movement itself around the right to housing. Was it necessary for the 
movement to embrace that issue? Can single-issue movements forge links of solidarity, with other 
single-issue groups within civil society to create a pluralistic anti-capitalist movement? Such a 
scenario would involve an anti-eviction campaign working hand-in-hand with pro-housing 
campaigns throughout the wider community. That such a phenomenon didn’t take off can be 
traced from the overall decline of politicized civil society since the early 1990s. In Khayelitsha, 
SANCO became a bankrupt organization, little more the “development” arm of central 
government, while other types of civil society operated within social capital roles. The militancy 
and vision associated with civic-style structures had evaporated. The AEC symbolized the birth of 
a renewed spirit of defiance and resistance which has characterized subsequent uprisings from the 
poorest of Cape Town’s communities.42 In Site C, a community crisis group was in the making. 
Comrade News elaborated on what has started: 
 
“We the residents here, we have tried to organise ourselves and resist these conditions in which 
we are living because we could not tolerate the situation. The first thing that we have done is to 
register all the names of the various citizens in the area but anyway during our door-to-door 
campaign we heard other peoples views that there must be a meeting where we discuss about 
others being registered in the municipality system so that we can be able to access the basic 
services and privileges for the people who are living in the informal settlement. We don’t have 
toilets, we don’t have nearby water facilities, so then we have organised a meeting the people 
                                                 
41 Veriava, A. & Mckinley. D. (2005), op. cit. p. 26 
42 See for example, Victory for Cuba Heights Land Invaders, in Indymedia, 
http://sa.indymedia.org/news/2005/03/7742.php, (March 11th, 2005)  
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have shown support for this action to organise and mobilise because we also do need these basic 
needs but they don’t know as to how they can access these rights.” 
 
Activists noted how the constant flux of families and individuals in and out of the settlement 
made any sustainable organization and mobilization a much harder task than in more stable 
communities. Nevertheless, the meetings enabled residents to air grievances and begin to form 
visions in which they can gain access to services which they felt were intrinsic to human rights.  
 
Such local community crisis groups, although very much in an embryonic form, appear to be 
slowly marking their impact in South Africa. In Greenbury, Phoenix outside Durban, the death of 
Marcel King marked another new moment against cut-offs in post-apartheid struggles. His 
mother noted: 
 
“He died a hero. He was protecting me and standing for his community. We must not live in fear 
because we think they are going to shoot us. We are stronger. They may have killed Marcel but 
that is only one, they cannot kill all of us.”43
 
Certainly the events in Harrismith, and across the Free State since 2005, bear testimony that the 
demands of the struggles have emerged in rights based discourses which have begun to cut across 
a variety of social classes. Memorandums include the redistribution of land for all, the creation of 
non-racial polities to challenge the geographical realities left by apartheid, and access to a variety 
of services and employment. Such a discourse, forming an alternative pole of reference, will face 
as it grows stronger, the “logic” immersed within the ANC project of transformation embodied by 
neo-liberalism. This example from the Cape Times highlights how such a culture has permeated 
mainstream South African discourse: 
 
“A pair of blue and black electrical wires illegally strung between shacks has robbed a 
Khayelitsha family of their five-year-old son, Lindani Ncalo […] Police say Lindani was 
electrocuted when he stepped on an illegal wire connection, since cut.” 
 
The article, without any background to the struggle faced by millions for electricity ended with 
the plea for: “To report illegal connections, contact Eskom's crime line on 0800 11 27 22.”44 It 
                                                 
43 See the moving film, Marcel King Is Dead, (2004), Indymedia Durban 
44 “Illegal electricity connection claims life of Khayelitsha boy” in Cape Times, 
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symbolizes the mockery and emptiness of claims made in 1994 that communities would be 
“involved at all levels of decision-making and implementation.”45
 
Alex and the APF 
 
“Instead of talking about formal bourgeois rights, which have not been realised anywhere in 
Africa, the South African revolutionaries should strive for participatory democracy, i.e. the right 
of the people to act on their own behalf, as they are already doing in their present spontaneous 
struggles. Here, the term “the people”, should be understood as referring not to the 
undifferentiated mass so beloved of liberals but to popular classes, name workers and peasants.”46
Archie Mafeje – 1992 
 
Any discussion around the nature and formation of new social movements requires an analysis of 
the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and its various affiliates.47 The APF reflects various interests 
which have assumed a broad coalition with its own distinct identity. On one level the APF has put 
into place structures and layers of communication that mirror any regular political party. Yet 
there are also strong undercurrents to the movement that challenge the types of organisation 
associated with party politics, whether they are working class or bourgeois. One of the over-
riding features of the movement is the drive to be “democratic” and open. In some ways this is a 
legacy of the culture of mass meetings of the 1980s, but with a conscious desire to maintain that 
they do not become purely rubber-stamping mechanisms for leaders and vanguards.   
 
The visions we outlined in Part 1 around NSM democratic theory appear to be well established 
within the movement. Largely autonomous grassroots organizations form equivalences of 
interest. These community groups across the Gauteng province develop their own singularities 
within a rights based discursive paradigm finding common cause with other affiliates. Typically 
the rights-based approach has taken on two forms of political activity. One is a legal or moral 
approach to the state, often around service delivery, right to protest and social justice. In similar 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://capetimes.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=271&fSetId=158&fArticleId=2411025
(February 15, 2005) 
45 RDP, (1994), op. cit. paragraph. 22-28.   
46 Mafeje, A, (1992), op. cit. p. 65 
47 There are currently around 25 affiliates to the APF. Many of them take are crisis committees or 
concerned resident groups and come from across the Gauteng region. The APF is also active in Cape Town, 
but on nothing of the scale of Gauteng activity.  
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ways to which the concerned residents in Harrismith used the Charter, People’s Contract, and so 
on, the APF has used the South African Constitution (1996) in its discourse.  
 
The other approach congeals around direct action which challenge and at times bypass the state 
pursuing what Mafeje noted as the “right of the people to act on their own behalf”. This has taken 
shape in “illegal” electricity connections, the destruction of pre-paid water metres by APF 
members and forms of community-led development.   
 
A veteran member of the AVCC affiliate of the APC stated: 
 
“When we saw that we were in trouble, we did join the APF. It’s the one which takes us out from 
the prison. Even now we still have cases and going to court, because of this electricity. This APF 
is the one which helps us.”48
 
But the APF is far more than any social capital organisation. In Alexandra members sought to 
institute development practices at a local level, for themselves and by themselves: 
 
“We saw the flats in 1999. We came to those flats and then we stayed here till now. There was no 
water, no toilets. There were no doors; we put them ourselves. After that we asked for electricity. 
They refused. We take it illegally and then Citipower cut off the electricity.”49
 
The AVCC is engaged in a running battle to maintain electricity. The residents who make up the 
flats had all been denied access to RDP housing. Their action is evidence of the community being 
“involved” in at least some fundamental levels of “decision-making and implementation”. 50 The 
organization provides an inspiration as to how commitment and co-operation can bring about 
empowerment which challenges the top-down enrichment project for Mbeki’s bourgeoisie. 
Across Alexandria living conditions have deteriorated to the most appalling levels. A group of 
various families who sheltered within a giant dilapidated tent all had various stories of 
dispossession or eviction to share. A young mother noted: 
 
                                                 
48 Personnel Communication, Alexandra Vukuzenzele Crisis Committee, (10th November, 2004) various 
interviews and film footage 
49 ibid.  
50 RDP, (1994) op. cit. paragraphs 22-28.   
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 “I can’t see anything that is like democracy as we are still staying in this horrible place. Even if 
it’s raining the water is coming over us while when it’s hot there are rats. We can’t even put out 
our groceries as the rats are there […] I don’t see any point to the procedure of voting as even if I 
can vote I will still stay here, we always vote and stay the same.”51
 
Such despondency with the electoral system appeared to have taken root with all activists in civil 
society who were interviewed. Any analysis of the voting turnout in the 2004 elections suggests 
this is a growing national phenomenon.52  
 
Victoria Bambiso, a leading member in the AVCC stated:  
 
“On my side I don’t think that in the elections next year we need to vote. The reasons we are 
voting for, we don’t see them. We did vote for Mandela and then we said that freedom is coming 
and then we didn’t see it. And then we voted for Mbeki and instead of better it was worse. We 
were suffering. They were selling water to us, people were being taken out of houses, no 
electricity, everything. Instead of things getting better we are just suffering.” 
 
She went on to note why the official Alexandra Renewal Project (ARP) is popularly labelled the 
Alexandra Removal Project: 
 
“Mbeki, he gets to the high chair and then we he arrives at the Parliament he just forgets about us. 
He has got a thing called get rich, get richer, get poor, get poorer. I don’t see that the voting 
system is going to do anything. Even this renewal project, it’s not a good thing in Alex. I just see 
people suffering because they renew Alex but they take people to Diepsloot and Braam Fischer. 
What are they renewing this Alexander for?” 
 
Lavie Mdakane had been evicted from central Alexandra under the promise that suitable RDP 
housing would become available by October 2004. In the meantime citizens live in matchbox 
concrete blocks: 
 
                                                 
51 See Indymedia film footage, (10th November, 2004) 
52 McKinley, D. (20th May, 2005), A Disillusioned Democracy: South African Elections Ten Years On, 
Mail and Guardian  
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“We don’t see any movement because instead of renewing Alex they remove. They said they 
would build houses for us on the other side and then when we go there they are full of other 
people and these houses which they promised us are not there. We didn’t see anything there they 
are people who we don’t know in those flats. They are not people from Alex. Instead of taking us 
back to the flats, they take us to Bram Fischer. I don’t think I am going to vote for the local 
government, I don’t see any need to vote because since they started there is nothing accomplished 
which I can see.” 
 
The justification is that shack residents are not losing anything because their housing situation is 
the same as it was before, and yet their removal from existing community networks removes any 
local input over the development of non-racial polities. Meanwhile changes to Alex appeared to 
be largely cosmetic: 
 
“They clean the streets while on the other hand people are still staying in the shelters, and on the 
other side the drains are still coming up and they are still dirty but they said they are cleaning the 
streets. We don’t know what is this renewal project which they are doing? That’s why we with 
the other people have decided to take the flats. We as AVCC we are going to be fighting with the 
government and we as a community are going to fight with our government until they do the 
things we want them to do … the things that we didn’t get done with the first government. The 
politics, we have to fight for the politics.”53
 
Apathy with parliamentary democracy should not be seen as extending to any passive acceptance 
of the way in which local development has taken shape. The whole issue of participation within 
parliamentary elections goes to the heart of debates within the APF and the SMI generally.54 
While activists from the AVCC questioned in this research were opposed to such participation, 
other voices, particularly within the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and the 
Socialist Bloc of the APF have argued in favour.55  
 
                                                 
53 Personnel Communication, (11th November, 2004),Victoria Bambiso, AVCC and APF 
54 It formed the main issue when social movements met at The Rosa Luxemburg Seminar, 3-5 March 2005, 
Workers Library and Museum, Newtown, “The Left: Participation & Engagement with Bourgeois 
Institutions” 
55 AVCC, (2004), Focus Group Discussion, November 10th, and Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee 
(SECC), Ideas for running Candidates in the Local Government Elections, Johannesburg, 
http://www.apf.org.za/article.php3?id_article=69 (December, 2004) 
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Groups such as the SECC, who are preparing to field candidates in the forthcoming elections, are 
sensitive to this debate surrounding participation in bourgeois democracy and see the attainment 
of power through elections as a form of protest against that very system.56 This leads to questions 
as to if such action forms part of a protest tool, what is wrong with a boycott or spoilt ballot 
approach? Furthermore, even if groups contest elections and are genuine in their suggestions that 
they will opt out of he system, how might attempts for co-option and the lure of power play out? 
Despite our concern here with “local” politics we are reminded of Mafeje’s reflection on 
liberation movements generally: 
 
“Many of the heroes of the independence movement in Africa turned the same, joined the 
imperialist exploiters, and made pariahs of their own people. Was it simply an act of betrayal and 
capriciousness on the part of those concerned; or was it a result of certain objective factors.”57
 
If the left becomes engaged in electoral politics, could this forge the beginning of a broader 
alliance? Would it develop a sense of “realism” to “objective” factors which would stifle 
revolutionary possibilities for change? Certainly there are elements of the SMI who see the 
formation of a mass working class movement, that will eventually contest the ANC on an 
electoral level as a future goal. In terms of our historicity of social movements and their relations 
to capitalism and vision of democracy, as laid out in Part 1, we need to be aware of what kind of 
dangers such developments might pose? How would such a movement institutionalize People’s 
Power? How could it avoid resembling typical forms of elitist structure and leadership which 
have been at least partly responsible for demobilization of “democracy” as we have explored 
throughout previous eras. How could power be diffracted in a political machine where impulses 
are tendencies are for the congealing of power in the centre? Could a party structure seek ways in 
which it is undermined and defrayed without being defeated by liberal, conservative and 
bourgeois forces? As we have noted these shape the debates throughout Venezuelan society as the 
multitude attempts to engage in forms of People’s Power while the structures under which it is 
protected (Chavez and Movement of the Fifth Republic) seek to consolidate the Bolivarian 
revolution from the very real reactionary forces of imperialism and Empire.  
 
That the construction of South Africa’s social movements might form a new multitude movement 
that will be drawn into bourgeois political institutions, need not spell gloom that such structures 
                                                 
56 ibid. 
57 Mafeje, A. (1992), op. cit. p. 73     
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will coalesce into totalitarian, anti-democratic projects. Indeed, given the nature of the South 
African transition and the spaces opened up in previous struggles they are well armed, equipped 
and prepared to resist co-option and totalitarianism, just as much as they could be drawn into 
existing bourgeois institutions, policies and structures. Indeed such logic pervades the “left” of 
the ANC, particularly the SACP in its justification for its part in the Alliance, that a war of 
position can entrench and protect working class power. This would appear unlikely given the 
class forces, which have become, and are, dominant in the ANC project. Yet in a new political 
formation, especially given the civic and direct forms of resistance that are growing, the genuine 
search for alternatives could still emerge and be institutionalized (within the initial phase) through 
a dualist direct/parliamentary democratic route as being played out in Venezuela.  
 
It is too simplistic to suggest the APF is marked by two political tendencies on a spectrum from 
autonomist thought to Marxist-Leninism. Positions are far more fluid than such a reading. While 
some feel the APF should be reaching out to the community and resident crisis groups in the Free 
State, some activists within the APF see the eruptions that have taken place in the Free State as 
more than capable of sustaining their own features of struggle that can find commonality with the 
APF without having to come under its umbrella.58  
 
Moreover, the ideologies of ex SACP, ANC, workerist trade unionists are now placed on an 
entirely new “trajectory” of struggle where revolutionary subjects of the APF are a distant cluster 
from the orthodox conceptions of the “working class”. Membership of the APF resembles the 
multitude in its composition of a variety of “social classes”. They share grievances formed from 
their hostility to the sites of subordination arising from commodification. Thus the unemployed 
youth, pensioners, landless, and evicted join forces with the urban and politicised activists. This 
forms an interesting dialectic in terms of those who are present in the central structures of the 
APF, mostly from the suburban and wealthier areas of Johannesburg. They are defined and 
affected by commodification and neo-liberalism across the social in ways which cut away the 
distinction of purely a petty-bourgeois status as we argued in Part 1 (subjects being defined by 
the multiplicity of relations). Yet amongst the subjects of resistance defined as the “poors” what 
can be the role of activists within stuggles?59 Clearly they represent distinct social classes but 
with features of politicisation that give potential for finding commonality with a variety of others 
in the multitude. It leads us to question - should certain groups be elevated within the struggle? To 
                                                 
58 Personnel Communication, Nicolas Dieltens, (November 15th, 2004) APF  
59 Desai, A. (2002), We are the Poors, op. cit.  
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what extent can whites play any form of leadership roles in struggles which we have identified in 
Part 3 as having a clearly defined racial component of exploitation to them? How these issues are 
resolved will obviously determine the direction of the movement. In terms of fleshing out some 
kind of “trajectory” of liberation politics we can identify three broad phenomenon which are 
likely to shape and be contested in the next decade: 
 
1 – autonomous and closely linked crisis groups which find a loose central structure throwing up 
increasingly viable and dominant alternatives to capitalism and the free market  
2 – a formalized political party that seeks to entrench the power of poor and emerging in both 
parliamentary and direct democratic forms 
3 – top-down Marxist-Leninist party that will serve to centralize the democratic expressions and 
spaces that are emerging  
 
However, to see such processes as distinct and unique to one another is an over-simplification of 
the fluidity in which NSM politics and discourse operates in South Africa. They serve to hint at 
the broad outlines in which social movement and civil society based politics are moving. In 
coming towards our final conclusions of NSM, we turn our attention to the largest social 
movement in South Africa, the LPM. 
 
Landless Peoples’ Movement 
 
“The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the 
people; […] Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-
divided amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger.” 
- The Freedom Charter, 1955 
 
The entrenched property clause in post-apartheid South Africa’s Bill of Rights (1994) made it 
virtually impossible to implement an all-embracing agrarian reform programme.60 Negotiations 
may have secured majority rule but beneath the transition laid fundamental compromises. Just as 
the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) found little space for manoeuvre at Lancaster 
House in 1979, so too did South Africa’s major liberation movement face powerful forces which 
sought to moderate and control the terms of majority rule and property rights. 
                                                 
60 Without access to massive financing. 
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Any understanding of the LPM requires an elaboration of the history of dispossession of 
Africans to the commons. This is not the place for a detailed exploration of colonial and 
apartheid South Africa, but rather, a brief understanding of relations within the country pre-
1994, and an outline of land policy in the new democracy.  
The infamous Land Act of 1913 confined blacks to around 13% of the total land of South 
Africa, and prohibited land acquisition in “white” areas. Tenancy and sharecropping were 
outlawed. The law mirrored and enshrined the land thefts and general disenfranchisement of 
blacks across three centuries of colonial settler aggression. 
Apartheid idealized the visions of colonial states to the north. It crystallized the settler 
population as the guardians of the most fertile, productive land seeking to split the African 
population into constructed ethnic and tribal patterns of divide and rule. Bantustans would 
remain dependent upon the stewardship, dominance and guidance of white South Africa. 
Demands for cheap labour could not be satisfied by market forces as long as people had 
access to independent resources and livelihoods, and the state intervened to create such a 
labour supply in both rural and urban areas.61 Industrialised South Africa “developed” in the 
capitalist logic of the term, from the destruction, death and dispossession of Africans. By the 
1980s intense urbanization was reflected in that about 50% of the total population resided in, 
but mostly around, cities. Forced relocation of millions of people intensified deep social 
dislocation in urban and rural areas. 
Liberation revolved around narratives of grievance and dispossession. It was rooted in themes 
of resistance and defiance. Above all it necessitated a strong state and social justice based 
strategy for reversing past injustices. The two major contributions the LPM has made to 
struggles in post-apartheid South Africa is in its role in breaking down the artificially 
constructed rural/urban divides of apartheid, and in articulating rights based discourse 
immersed in the Charter, which cuts across social classes on the issue of land.  
 
The new South African government had a mandate that was self-created and driven by 
expectations that arose out of the liberation struggle. The reinforcement of the land question 
                                                 
61 Hallowes, D. & Butler, M. (2002), Power, Poverty and Marginalized Environments: A Conceptual 
Framework in McDonald, D. (ed.), “Environmental Justice in South Africa”, Cape Town: UCT Press, 
p. 61 
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was forged by the personal experiences of many within the ANC, warranting the land 
question precedence in the attentions of the new South African state. The Back to the Land 
Campaign of 1993, a network of various local communities, maintained the presence of land 
access in notions of South African transformation. How the state would tackle and ensure 
redistribution was at the heart of debate within the ANC, and the general milieu of a country 
shedding its apartheid past. 
 
In 1993, the World Bank had put forward its own model for future land redistribution in 
South Africa, pegged at 30% of medium to high quality land. This was envisaged to be from 
large-scale white commercial farmers to around 600,000 small-scale black farm 
households.62 The programme retained the integrity of the markets while aspiring to deliver 
social justice to those marginalised and excluded during apartheid. The World Bank looked 
to draw more of the populace into trade, as defined within its own agricultural export 
development paradigm. 
This goal of 30% emerged in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) policy document 
of the ANC of 1994, reflecting the policy links which had emerged between the ANC and the IFIs 
during the CODESA years. Within five years, land reform was expected to take on three broad policy 
components: 
Firstly, land restitution was designed to restore land ownership, or at least adequate financial 
compensation, to those who were dispossessed after 1913. Tools included provincially based 
restitution commissions and a Lands Claim Court to act as an arbiter. 
Secondly, the land redistribution programme aimed at providing the poor with access to land 
for both productive and residential purposes. Settlement Land Acquisition Grants (SLAGS) 
were one means by which the state envisaged an African smallholding class would emerge. 
Thirdly, housing projects to provide adequate shelter set targets designed to radically re-
shape the shacks and shanties into urban areas with access to services such as water and 
electricity. ANC policies advanced private-public partnership (PPP) as the most effective and 
efficient mechanism by which investment could begin to take shape. 
                                                 
62 World Bank, (1993), Options for Land Reform and Rural Restructuring in South Africa, Land and 
Agricultural Policy Centre Conference, Johannesburg 
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The overall approach to land took on a market-based approach to redistribution and 
development, with the state playing a central role in facilitating the shape of a transformed 
South Africa. The willing-seller, willing-buyer model was in consensus with the ANC's 
vision of reconciliation which included the maintenance of property relations. We can draw 
comparisons with common patterns of immediate decolonisation in Africa such as in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. The rationale behind these policies was the retention of investor confidence 
and part of an overall development paradigm to achieve growth and social justice through 
neo-liberal capitalism. Economic “development” it was hoped, would redress previous 
injustices. 
 
The Labour Tenure Act (1996) and Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA - 1997) 
sought to tackle the insecurity of farm tenants who had been reliant on paternalistic 
relationships with farmers. Throughout apartheid, paternalism had forged dependency 
relationships and identities based upon farmer “goodwill” and tenant “passivity”. Yet, despite 
new legal guarantees for tenants and the introduction of a minimum wage for farm-workers, 
it has been shown that in many instances this legislation served to worsen the plight of the 
rural poor and vulnerable serving to entrench inequalities along racial lines.63 Farmers 
responded to the various acts designed to increase tenure or security by increasing 
evictions.64 This was compounded by the socio-political networks, which particularly in rural 
areas involved the police, private security companies, farmers and the courts.65 That farmers 
continually find creative solutions to avoid paying the minimum wage, often by over-
charging for access to grazing or provision of basic services, has been well documented.66
By the ANC’s second term, the settlement of only a handful of the almost 100,000 cases 
which had been lodged with the department, contributed to a sense of despondency and 
disillusionment with the handling of the land transformation. From the projection of 30% 
redistribution, the state had managed less than 1%. An official review of the departments 
work in 1999 noted the DLA as “a highly centralised and fragmented bureaucracy... with 
poor race relations ... and a high black staff turnover.”12
                                                 
63 James, D. (2003), Clientalism and the moral economy of land: the farm-dweller conundrum, Manuscript 
prepared at London School of Economics, London, p. 11 
64 ibid. p. 12, Greenburg, S. (2004), Post-apartheid development, landlessness and the reproduction of 
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65 Personnel Communication, Samantha Hargreaves (May 22nd, 2004), LPM Organizer 
66 See Greenburg, S. (2004) op. cit.  
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It signalled the entire redistribution policy being put on hold shortly after the 1999 elections, 
and a lengthy period of internal policy adjustment. In 2000, new minister Thoko Didiza 
introduced a fresh redistribution policy: an Integrated Programme of Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development in South Africa (IPLRAD).67 It marked a shift away from 
rhetorical concerns of alleviating the rural poor to the promotion of agricultural production 
and commercial farming through the establishment of smaller group of highly productive, 
elite black farmers. 
The programme extended the timeframe for the redistribution of 30% and was now inclusive 
of land transferred to black ownership through ordinary market transactions. Compensation, 
increasingly become a “statistical escape mechanism” for the ANC.68 Analysis showed cash 
settlements were having no impact upon the racially distorted patterns of land ownership and 
were not challenging the demographics of apartheid.69 SLAGS now required beneficiaries to 
make a minimum R5000 contribution, from which the state would make a grant payment. 
The DLA noted: "The chain of progress is thus one of increasing scale, commercialisation of 
inputs and outputs, and commitment to full time farming.”  
 
Moreover further wage legislation passed in 2002 has had little effect on the actual conditions 
of workers. Farmers continue to make big deductions for various services and recent. The 
exposure of this exploitation tends to be limited in the press, and when is highlighted only 
covers the tip of the iceberg of employer exploitation.70 Furthermore, the Communal Land 
Rights Bill of 2002 offers traditional authorities (particularly those identified in the former 
homelands) even greater control over land use and administration than under apartheid.71  
 
The role of civil society around land, and particularly a number of NGOs, reflected the general 
approach we have identified of cooperation with the state post-1994. Work centred on carrying 
out the technical work of information dissemination, capacity-building, legal support, research, 
mediation, and other forms of intervention aimed at identifying and closing the legal and 
                                                 
67 After a series of future drafts became known as the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
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68 Hargreaves, S. & Eveleth, A. (2003), The land restitution programme: Advancing real reform or 
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71 Greenburg, S. (2004), Op. Cit. p. 20 and see Alexander, A. (2004), op. cit. 
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bureaucratic gaps in the new land reform programs.72 Rather than highlighting some of the major 
issues with the policies, such as whether redistribution of 30% of the total land and the creation of 
600,000 small scale black farm households went far enough, or the fact that most land 
dispossession in South Africa occurred before 1913, did not feature in the “developmental” ideas 
of most NGOs in their discourse and outreach.  
 
Yet while the ANC-led government conceived its land policy, the landless simultaneously 
developed their own demands, attitudes and expectations based on the expectations of the 
struggle. The LPM emerged in 2001 as a fusion of the crisis style civic groups (largely, but not 
exclusively rural and in Mpumalanga), Gauteng based activists and the National Land 
Commission (NLC). Since its emergence it has grown steadily, and come to embrace a wide 
variety of concerns around land access creating a meeting place for a wide range of groups. 
Diverse experiences of individuals occupying over-crowded apartments in downtown 
Johannesburg, living in informal settlements surrounding the city, and working on rural farms 
form a melting pot of classes divided under apartheid’s demography. Moreover, the definition of 
“landless” is dissociated from orthodox views of only rural, black peasants requiring land for 
small farming, a notion pervading IFI and developmental discourse. 
 
Though the LPM is calling for changes in national land policy, their efforts are largely symbolic, 
and at times defensive. In the first instance they focus on preventing evictions from rural farms, 
peri-urban settlements and downtown apartment complexes. Symbolic forms of protest typically 
revolve around “land invasions” or occupations, together with publicised campaign stunts such as 
“No land, No Vote” in the 2004 general elections.  
 
Demands are woven into a populist and nationalist agenda, which explicitly addresses the plight 
of urban and rural poor, and challenges the overall paradigm of neo-liberal policies. The LPM 
takes the position that South Africa has achieved only a “ballot box” democracy. Under this 
system, the poor and landless are called “citizens” but do not own land. It recognizes the 
importance the Freedom Charter has within its discourse. Mangaliso Kubheko, a national co-
ordinator of the LPM stated: “It doesn’t matter which political party is in power. What we want is 
the implementation of the Freedom Charter”.73
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Within this context, the LPM has sought to engage the government into a national land summit 
over the last few years, and hold it to account on the basis of the Charter. At the end of 2004 the 
LPM engaged with the SACP around the “Red October” campaign, to highlight the inadequacies 
of land redistribution and continued exploitation amongst black farm workers. This has been an 
uneasy relationship which for the present appears to be under strain.74  
 
Structurally the organization has relied on funding and direction from the NLC, with a core group 
of activists having worked, or currently working for, the group. This has caused friction within 
the NLC which has been the constant attention of the media. Furthermore, the LPM often 
operates on two levels. Activist leadership in Gauteng perform outreach programmes, form policy 
and seek to engage in dialogue with other groups. On the ground (where sections of the 
leadership are located) meetings continue to raise awareness and consciousness of land and 
housing rights and access. The LPM has grown to become the largest new social movement in 
South Africa.  
 
Consequently, and as a sign of their growing strength, the LPM has gained the attention of the 
state. It has sought to co-opt them, and also, to attack the organization. In a press statement before 
the 2004 elections the ANC noted: 
 
“South Africa is a constitutional democracy that enshrines the right to demonstrate and freedom 
of expression, but such rights do not include a right to perpetuate lies, violate the law and act in a 
manner calculated to polarize society ... The ANC indeed respects the right of the Landless 
People's Movement to choose to forgo their right to vote, but will not tolerate any act calculated 
at intimidating people and stopping them from exercising their right to vote.”75
 
Indeed, its lack of “tolerance” to the organization manifested in ugly incidents after the LPM 
staged a “No Land, No Vote” protest on election polling day. Detaining several activists, police 
abuse bordered on torture during interrogation, recalling ugly methods used by the apartheid 
regime. While the issue of land and housing remain unresolved for the majority of South 
Africans, the LPM’s rhetoric is likely to increase in popularity and resonance. In her thorough 
analysis of the LPM, Alexander notes: 
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“As the new social movements develop their class ideology and pursue a more rigorous structural 
analysis, they will take democracy into their own hands.”76
 
The link between a “rigorous structural analysis” and the emergence of “democracy” perhaps 
seeks more cohesion and co-ordination in moments of defiance, insurrection and alternatives, 
than shape the realities of social movement politics. Events in the Free State are not hinged upon 
a thorough analysis of neo-liberal theory, but rather upon the visions and alternatives deemed to 
be the right of the people. This appears to be true of a wealth of uprisings which are marking 
2005 and sweeping across the country. Do such insurrectionary moments require more 
sophisticated elaboration, and a unity of class to gain hegemony? We have argued for weaving 
back in the dialectic based around the multitude and commodification. Sensitivity to exploitation 
and the destruction to the commons from neo-liberal policies, across all levels of the social, is one 
area where the LPM could become an increasingly significant player. However any form of 
“class unity” between South Africa’s social classes is a distinctly different project to orthodox 
leftist models. Success is not hinged upon movements becoming formalized. Visions, rather than 
“structural analysis”, take form and shape in vibrant and justice based streams of ideology that are 
fermenting into that meeting point of possibility for communities across South Africa. 
Communication and partnership between them, in a space and focal point such as the SMI, may 
well provide a launching pad for a sustained and effective challenge to the policies which have 
shaped the first ten years of South Africa’s freedom.  
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Identities of defiance 
 
“I notice people always say ‘under Socialism’. They look forward to being on top – with all the 
others underneath, being told what is good for them.”  
- George Orwell 
 
“This democracy. We can see it in the urban areas, but here we cannot see anything, since it came 
I can say that people that get houses, democracy has been only for those ones. Instead of going 
forward we are dying.” 
- Lavie Mdakane, APF member, Alexandria 2004 
 
The South African Communist Party, a few months before the Berlin Wall was torn down stated: 
“Socialist countries today represent a powerful international force. Some of them possess highly 
developed economies, a considerable scientific base, and a reliable military defence potential. 
[…] A new way of life is taking shape in which there are neither oppressors nor the oppressed, 
neither exploiters nor the exploited, in which power belongs to the people.” 1
 
The SACP, and the Alliance “left” in general, were shattered by the tumultuous events of 1989-
1991. Those alternatives to neo-liberalism, based upon totalitarian systems, in no way resembled 
some of the remarkable moments which opened up during the struggle years of the 1980s. This 
was the result of work by communities and individuals, some of whom were distant to Congress 
thought, and some of whom placed all their energies and identities within such politics. During 
the transition period such demands became consolidated, co-opted or isolated by a developmental 
discourse that was shaped not just by the agencies of the ANC, but also by the pull of other 
structures such as IFIs, international capital, and the remnants of the white apartheid forces. 
Nevertheless, subaltern demands re-emerged at the turn of the century in new political 
formations, many of which bore remarkable similarities to the civics of the 1980s and notions of 
people’s power.  
 
The nature of the transition period had drastically demobilized and depoliticized these forces. 
This was reflected on a global scale with the velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe forging 
complicity within civil movements for neo-liberal policies of political economy. George Bush, 
Samuel Huntingdon and Francis Fukuyama alike lauded this as some kind of end of history. The 
                                                 
1 The African Communist, (1989), No. 3, p. 118 
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dramatic resurgence of anti-capitalist movements has initiated a new set of challenges to systemic 
forces and the left. Hinged upon a rejection of totalitarian state socialism, neo-liberal politics and 
parliamentary alternatives of social democracy, the awkward assembly of anti-globalisation 
forces engage in pro-active visions of alternatives.  
 
Implicit to this process is a fundamental overhaul of some of the normative terms around 
development, democracy and good governance. It counters mainstream assumptions which fail to 
perceive the democratic aspirations beneath the surface of “official” civil society, government 
institutions and NGOs. Horowitz’s statement in 1991, that South Africa was suffering from an 
absence of “a strong, autonomous civil society with a stake in maintaining democracy” could not 
have been further from the truth.2 South Africa had a rich history of civil society, and grassroots 
movements, which had played a fundamental part in shaping the alternatives people believed the 
struggle could institutionalise.   
 
If new social movements are to enjoy further success, they will need to continue injecting life and 
vitality into the semantics of “justice” and “democracy”. While this at times has invoked pressure 
on the state (whether it be moral, legal), the defiance and insurrection symbolized throughout the 
Free State, in various land occupations, in the destruction of pre-paid water metres, and in the 
community empowerment projects across townships and squatter camps; all herald a new 
trajectory for struggle in South Africa. Activists and ideologies steeped in Marxist-Leninism have 
been thrown into an identity crisis. The composition and democracy of the “working class” has 
moved away from crude economist perceptions. A focus on the de-globalisation of capital and the 
globalisation of people has thrown up new paradigms of development and organization currently 
at an embryonic stage. Some of the examples we have considered in South Africa have a 
conscious and ideological critique of forces which they seek to contest. However, this need not be 
a determining factor in assessing the ability of movements to challenge the state and capital. The 
resurgence of civic structures and community crisis groups – many of which retain identities to 
the ANC and the Charter – has been based around a proactive system of ideals, commonalities 
and visions which have begun to place very real demands and grievances upon the state. Together 
the moments of disrupture across South Africa may yield significant potential in presenting anti-
capitalist, commons based approaches to development, services and land.  
 
                                                 
2 Horowitz, D, (1991), op. cit. p. 241 
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South African new social movements have an imbued culture of democracy, linked strongly to 
the 1980s. However, they transgress movements which to some extent placed the result, above 
the means of struggle. Even if parliamentary means are developed within the SMI, or a new 
leftist-front, to challenge dominant power structures, it need not symbolize a familiar narrative of 
further elite-pacting, reinforcement of top-down hierarchies of power, and assimilation into the 
international capitalist order. Venezuela provides at least one example where contestation of the 
state and “development” is being played out in creative and imaginative forms.  
 
The debate as to whether people are worse off now than under apartheid is not necessary. No 
critical analysis can see the regime facilitating what the ANC has. However, the ANC’s attempts 
to deliver social justice have given way to dominant class interests and capital, initiating a system 
of trickle-down economics to alleviate past injustices. This has only served to sharpen and refine 
the racialized aspects of post-apartheid society. The Constitution, the RDP and Charter have 
become fetishized and brandished by Mbeki and the Alliance as part of this class project. Yet, a 
new discourse, serving to be a weapon of the poor, disempowered and landless is emerging in 
moments of disrupture and struggle. The granting of human rights at a constitutional level has 
never brought an end to the exploitation of the multitude. Yet a war of position around the 
semantics of such documents, yielding anti-capitalist interpretations, pose real challenges to the 
logic of neo-liberalism and commodification of life and relations. 
 
This means asserting control over the journey from comrade to citizen so that the process doesn’t 
become synonymous with continued dispossession and poverty. This is undoing the hegemony 
elite and dominant classes and structures have over notions of change in South Africa. Those for 
who experiences with freedom have meant little more than “ten years of confusion”, symbolizes 
what millions of South Africans are beginning to consider: what was the democracy we fought 
for and where do we go from here? 
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